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This Article analyzes the under-explored phenomenon of uni-
lateral exit from international agreements and intergovernmental 
organizations. Although clauses authorizing denunciation and 
withdrawal from treaties are pervasive, international legal scholars 
and international relations theorists have largely ignored them. This 
Article draws upon new empirical evidence to provide a comprehensive 
interdisciplinary framework for understanding treaty exit. It examines 
when and why states abandon their treaty commitments and explains 
how exit helps to resolve certain theoretical and doctrinal puzzles 
that have long troubled scholars of international affairs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
HE international legal system is grounded on a fundamental 
principle: pacta sunt servanda—treaties must be obeyed.1 
States, or more precisely the government officials who represent 
their interests at diplomatic negotiating conferences, are masters of 
their treaty commitments. No state can be forced to accept a treaty 
without its consent, nor can it be compelled to join an intergov-
T 
1 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”). 
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ernmental organization against its will. Once a state has assented to 
a treaty and has successfully shepherded it through its national ap-
proval process, however, it must observe its treaty commitments in 
good faith. 
International law takes a dim view of challenges to this meta 
norm of treaty adherence. Claims of invalidity, changed circum-
stances, and other exculpatory doctrines are narrowly construed, 
with the result that most unilateral deviations are viewed as 
breaches of a treaty. True, a state may lawfully suspend adherence 
to a treaty or even cast it off altogether where another party has 
materially violated the agreement. But such reciprocal acts of non-
compliance, suspension, and abrogation are governed by an elabo-
rate set of limiting doctrines designed to avoid the vicious cycles of 
breach and counter-breach that would quickly cause interstate co-
operation to unravel.2 
Neither treaties nor the geostrategic context in which they are 
embedded are static, of course. When shifts in the political land-
scape or domestic preferences undermine a treaty’s objectives or 
render its terms unduly burdensome or obsolete, international law 
directs states to eschew unilateral action in favor of negotiation 
with their treaty partners. The plausible outcomes of such collabo-
rative efforts are constrained only by the parties’ ingenuity. They 
range from a temporary suspension of the treaty, to a modification 
of its terms, to wholesale abrogation of the agreement with or 
without the adoption of a fresh set of treaty commitments.3 
Yet buried at the back of most modern international agree-
ments, and often overlooked by scholars, are provisions that call 
into question international law’s unequivocal command that states 
must either obey treaties or cooperate in abrogating or revising 
them. Such provisions, known as denunciation or withdrawal 
2 For detailed discussion of the permissible responses to treaty breaches, see Shabtai 
Rosenne, Breach of Treaty 117–25 (1985) [hereinafter Rosenne, Breach of Treaty]; 
Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 188–90 (2d ed. 1984); 
John Norton Moore, Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A Neglected 
Remedy, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 881 (1999). 
3 See Arie E. David, The Strategy of Treaty Termination: Lawful Breaches and Re-
taliations 159–202 (1975) (discussing alternatives to unilateral termination and the le-
gal procedures used to achieve them).  
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clauses, permit a state to “exit” from a treaty that the state had 
previously ratified and that is otherwise valid and in force.4 
Distilled to their essence, exit clauses create a lawful, public 
mechanism for a state to terminate its treaty obligations or with-
draw from membership in an intergovernmental organization. De-
nunciation and withdrawal are also fundamentally unilateral acts. 
They do not require the consent or approval of other states and 
may often be effectuated simply by providing notice to the other 
parties. Moreover, a state that invokes these clauses to quit a treaty 
occupies a very different position from a state that breaches its 
treaty commitments. An exiting state faces different burdens and 
benefits, different prospects of being sanctioned, different reputa-
tional consequences, and different responses by other parties than 
a state that breaches an international agreement. 
Treaty clauses that authorize exit are pervasive. They are found 
in a wide array of multilateral and bilateral agreements governing 
key transborder regulatory issues, including human rights, trade, 
environmental protection, arms control, and intellectual property. 
More intriguingly, exit clauses impose different types and degrees 
of restrictions on a state’s ability legally to withdraw from a treaty 
and the obligations it imposes. And occasionally, exit clauses are 
absent altogether, raising the possibility that exit may be implicitly 
precluded as a matter of international law. This textual variation 
suggests that governments may be as interested in negotiating the 
conditions and contours of exit as they are in bargaining over a 
treaty’s substantive terms. 
States that invoke denunciation clauses do so to achieve differ-
ent objectives. For example, states have exercised their option to 
exit a treaty as a result of shifts in the preferences of domestic in-
4 In this Article, I use the terms “exit,” “denunciation,” and “withdrawal” inter-
changeably to refer to the act by which a state unilaterally quits its membership in a 
treaty (including a treaty that establishes an intergovernmental organization) pursu-
ant to the terms of the treaty providing for such denunciation or withdrawal. See U.N. 
Office of Legal Affairs, Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties Handbook, at 109, U.N. 
Sales No. E.04.V.3 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Handbook] (“The words denunciation 
and withdrawal express the same legal concept.”). A state that exits from a treaty in 
this way terminates its future obligations under the agreement. It is not, however, re-
leased from obligations that occurred, nor excused from violations that existed, prior 
to the date that its denunciation or withdrawal took effect. See Vienna Convention, 
supra note 1, art. 70(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 349. 
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terest groups, changes in treaty obligations, or expansions of the 
functions of intergovernmental organizations.5 These developments 
may create a disconnect between national interests and interna-
tional commitments that lead a state to pursue a policy of disen-
gagement, as occurred, for example, when North Korea withdrew 
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and when the United 
States withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.6 
The consequences of withdrawal are also diverse. They include: 
isolation (as in the case of North Korea); unilateral or bilateral al-
ternatives (the latter reflected in the Article 98 agreements that the 
United States negotiated after “unsigning” the treaty establishing 
the International Criminal Court);7 a la carte multilateralism (for 
example when Caribbean nations withdrew from a human rights 
treaty and then attempted to re-ratify the same treaty with a reser-
vation concerning the death penalty);8 and the creation of a new 
treaty regime with competing norms or institutions (as occurred 
when Iceland denounced the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling and, together with other pro-whaling states, 
established the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission).9 In 
these and other examples, exit provides a mechanism for states to 
disengage from or radically reconfigure existing forms of interna-
tional cooperation. 
At other times, however, states pursue exit (and threats of exit) 
not to dissociate themselves from future cooperation with other na-
5 In an earlier work, I referred to this dynamic as the “overlegalization” of interna-
tional law and intergovernmental organizations. See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegaliz-
ing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Carib-
bean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1832, 1851–58 
(2002) [hereinafter Helfer, Overlegalizing]. 
6 See Masahiko Asada, Arms Control Law in Crisis? A Study of the North Korean 
Nuclear Issue, 9 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 331, 341 (2004); Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the 
United States, and the World Court, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1445, 1445 (1985). 
7 See Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061, 2061–63 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Swaine, Unsigning]. 
8 See Helfer, Overlegalizing, supra note 5, at 1881–82. 
9 See David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North At-
lantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consen-
sual Structures, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 154, 155 (1995). Iceland denounced the Convention 
in 1992. It rejoined in 2002. See Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, Ice-
land’s History of Whaling, at http://www.wdcs.org/dan/publishing.nsf/allweb/ 
36FBBB89C0EF9A2980256F350055152D (last accessed Aug. 27, 2005). 
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tions but, as Albert Hirschman famously explained in the domestic 
context, as a strategy to increase their voice within an intergov-
ernmental organization or treaty-based negotiating forum.10 The 
United States’ denunciation in the 1970s and 1980s of the agree-
ments establishing the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) 
and the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organiza-
tion (“UNESCO”) follow this pattern.11 In each instance, the 
United States used exit and threats of exit—and the loss of organ-
izational support and funding these entailed—to pressure the or-
ganizations to change their behavior, after which it renewed its 
membership. The Soviet Union and its allies pursued a similar ap-
proach in the 1950s, temporarily withdrawing from but later rejoin-
ing the World Health Organization (“WHO”), UNESCO, and the 
ILO.12 More recently, the United States and the European Com-
munities used an exit strategy to close the Uruguay Round of trade 
talks that created the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). They 
withdrew from the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”)—a treaty that gave special benefits to developing coun-
tries—and then also ratified the new WTO Agreement as a “single 
undertaking,” forcing developing nations to accept a broad pack-
age of obligations favorable to United States and European inter-
ests.13 
10 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States 3–5, 15–20 (1970).  
11 See Mark F. Imber, The USA, ILO, UNESCO and IAEA: Politicization and 
Withdrawal in the Specialized Agencies (1989) (discussing the United States’ use of 
threats of withdrawal and actual withdrawal from the ILO and UNESCO in the late 
1970s to influence the organization’s substantive focus); Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to International Law, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 962, 977–79 (Sean D. 
Murphy ed., 2003) (discussing the United States’ withdrawal from UNESCO in 1984 
and subsequent return in 2003 after UNESCO had addressed issues of concern to the 
United States). 
12 N. Feinberg, Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization, 39 Brit. 
Y.B. Int’l L. 189, 204–11 (1963) (WHO and UNESCO); Victor-Yves Ghebali, The In-
ternational Labour Organisation: A Case Study on the Evolution of U.N. Specialised 
Agencies, in 3 International Organization and the Evolution of World Society 104–07 
(Roberto Ago & Nicolas Valticos eds., 1989) (ILO). For a more recent example, see 
C. J. Chivers, Uzbekistan: GUUAM Loses A ‘U,’ N.Y. Times, May 7, 2005, at A2 
(describing Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from a “five-nation organization of post-Soviet 
states” in response to the organization’s shift from a “pro-Kremlin” to a pro-Western 
policy orientation). 
13 See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 Int’l Org. 339, 359–60 (2002). 
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Given the prevalent use and diverse design of denunciation and 
withdrawal clauses, it is surprising that the subject of exiting trea-
ties has received so little attention in international law and interna-
tional relations (“IR”) scholarship. A few legal scholars deplore 
denunciation in passing as “a mask for anarchy, a practice which 
weakens the whole structure of treaty-created international obliga-
tions.”14 This negative view may reflect the fact that the history of 
treaty exit includes one of international law’s darkest episodes—
the failure of the League of Nations.15 Most legal scholars, by con-
trast, assume denunciation and withdrawal clauses to be mere boi-
lerplate provisions that states negotiate rarely and invoke even less 
frequently.16 
IR theorists, too, have mostly ignored the study of when and 
why states quit a treaty. Rather, these scholars have framed the 
two alternatives available to treaty parties as either cooperation or 
defection. Yet the ability of states to exit from international 
agreements—and from their costs and benefits, their avenues of 
persuasion and influence, and their information-sharing, monitor-
ing, and sanctioning mechanisms—belies the assumption that states 
face only a dichotomous choice between complying with treaties on 
the one hand or violating them on the other. 
Viewed even more broadly, taking treaty exit seriously compli-
cates existing understandings of interstate cooperation and compli-
14 See, e.g., C. Wilfred Jenks, A New World of Law? A Study of the Creative Imagi-
nation in International Law 180 (1969). 
15 In the decade leading up to the Second World War, Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
several other League members exercised their right to withdraw from the organiza-
tion, thereby avoiding even the mild sanctions that the global body had attempted to 
impose. Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Na-
tions: A Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies, and 
Their Quest for a Peaceful World 26–27 (2003). The widespread withdrawals from the 
League explain in part why the United Nations Charter does not contain an express 
denunciation clause. See Feinberg, supra note 12, at 197–202. 
16 See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, Managing the Risks of International Agreement 20–
21 (1981) (“Certain types of provisions, such as ‘final clauses’ . . . , have now become 
standardized or ‘boiler-plate’ in international agreements . . . .”); Arnold McNair, The 
Law of Treaties 510 (1961) (noting that treaty clauses permitting unilateral denuncia-
tion “occur[] so frequently that [they] hardly require[] illustration” or discussion); 
Aleksander Witold Rudzinski, Book Review, 71 Am. J. Int’l L. 805, 806 (1977) (re-
viewing Maria Frankowska, Denunciation of International Treaties (1976)) (stating 
that the “presumed right to withdraw has been very rarely invoked and never as an 
exclusive ground for [treaty] abrogation”). 
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ance with international law, whatever their disciplinary prove-
nance. When the option to exit is factored into the doctrinal rules 
of international law and the paradigms of IR theory, it calls into 
question assumptions and hypotheses that each discipline has 
taken for granted. Conversely, understanding when and why states 
exit treaties—or simply preserve their right to do so—helps to re-
solve certain theoretical and doctrinal puzzles that have long trou-
bled scholars of international affairs. 
The pervasiveness of treaty exit clauses and their largely unex-
amined theoretical and empirical implications highlight the need 
for a comprehensive interdisciplinary study of why governments 
negotiate clauses that authorize denunciation and withdrawal, the 
forms such clauses take, the functions they serve, and the condi-
tions under which states actually invoke the clauses to abandon 
their treaty commitments. This Article will provide a theoretical 
and empirical framework for understanding treaty exit and will lay 
the groundwork for future interdisciplinary research. 
Before proceeding, however, two cautionary notes are in order. 
First, treaty exit provisions do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they 
often operate in tandem with or as an alternative to myriad other 
flexibility devices—such as subject matter and membership restric-
tions, reservations, duration and amendment rules, escape clauses, 
and renegotiation provisions—that treaty makers use to address 
the pervasive uncertainty of international affairs.17 The first parts of 
this Article will hold these other risk management tools constant to 
identify the distinctive characteristics of exit and will isolate their 
17 See Kal Raustiala, Form & Substance in International Agreements, 99 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 581 (2005) [hereinafter Raustiala, Form & Substance]. For an early and influential 
assessment of these issues by an international legal scholar, see Bilder, supra note 16. 
The claim that the different components of international agreements and institutions 
are the product of conscious tradeoffs by governments has also attracted the attention 
of IR theorists. The Fall 2001 issue of the journal International Organization is de-
voted to a “rational design” project, which assesses the theoretical claim that “states 
use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions 
accordingly.” Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institu-
tions, 55 Int’l Org. 761, 762 (2001). The rational design project gives extended treat-
ment to flexibility devices, such as escape clauses, that treaty makers adopt in the face 
of future uncertainty. Id. at 793–95; see also B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, 
The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 
Int’l Org. 829, 835 (2001) (discussing escape clauses). The project gives much shorter 
shrift, however, to issues of exit. 
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influence on interstate cooperation and treaty compliance. The Ar-
ticle’s concluding Sections will relax this assumption to consider 
the relationship between exit and other treaty-based tools that 
states use to address uncertainty and manage risk. 
Second, and notwithstanding the linkages among these treaty 
design provisions, exit occupies a unique and somewhat paradoxi-
cal position at the juncture of international law and politics. In par-
ticular, exit has both cooperation-detracting and cooperation-
enhancing attributes. On the one hand, exit can be the ultimate act 
of disrespect for international rules and institutions. A state that 
absents itself from international organizations or agreements may 
effectively discredit those entities in the eyes of other states or do-
mestic interest groups. On the other hand, exit can have a law 
promoting function. Particularly given the international legal sys-
tem’s relatively anarchic environment, in which surreptitious shirk-
ing of treaty obligations is often plausible, a state’s decision to fol-
low the rules of the game, publicize a future withdrawal, and open 
itself to scrutiny demonstrates a kind of respect for international 
law. One of this Article’s objectives, therefore, will be to begin the 
complex process of disentangling the cooperation-detracting func-
tions of exit from its cooperation-enhancing and law promoting 
functions and to explore the relationships among them. 
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows. Part I will 
identify six distinctive characteristics of exit and distinguishes them 
from the breach of a state’s treaty commitments. I will return to 
these attributes of exit throughout the Article, amplifying their 
functions and explaining their relationship to existing theoretical 
paradigms. Parts II and III will describe the lack of attention to exit 
issues in, respectively, international law and IR scholarship. These 
parts will identify and analyze implicit but mistaken assumptions 
and omissions in each scholarly approach and illustrate how intro-
ducing an exit option into the theoretical mix enriches our under-
standing of the forms and functions of treaty-based cooperation. 
Part IV will explore the significance of exit for international law 
and politics. It will identify four unsettled or unexplored issues of 
interstate cooperation, two doctrinal and two theoretical, and con-
sider how the analysis of exit developed in this Article helps to re-
solve those issues. 
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I. SIX DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF TREATY EXIT 
Although many observers conflate exit with a state’s failure to 
comply with its treaty obligations, the act of quitting a treaty is dis-
tinctive in at least six ways from unsanctioned violations of interna-
tional law. 
First, exit, as I have defined it, is a formal, public act that re-
quires the denouncing state to inform its treaty partners or an in-
tergovernmental organization of its intention to withdraw.18 The 
inherently public nature of such an act contrasts with many treaty 
breaches (to use the parlance of international law practitioners and 
scholars) or treaty defections (the term favored by political scien-
tists and economists), where states shirk from a promised course of 
conduct while hiding that fact from other cooperating states.19 
Given the international legal system’s relatively weak monitoring 
and sanctioning mechanisms,20 one might reasonably wonder why a 
government would ever choose public exit if private cheating is 
both available and unlikely to be detected. 
A second distinctive feature of exit follows from its public na-
ture—the ability of states to use it to challenge or revise disfavored 
legal norms or institutions or to placate domestic interest groups. 
Withdrawing from an agreement (or threatening to withdraw) can 
give a denouncing state additional voice, either by increasing its 
leverage to reshape the treaty to more accurately reflect its inter-
ests or those of its domestic constituencies, or by establishing a ri-
val legal norm or institution together with other like-minded 
states.21 Exit thus sits at a critical intersection of law and power in 
international relations. 
18 See supra note 4. 
19 The ability of states to cheat on their treaty commitments surreptitiously should 
be distinguished from what might be called “noisy” breaches, in which a state uses a 
strategy of noncompliance to promote treaty revision or reform. Such a strategy is 
likely to be more costly than exit and threats of exit, however, since it involves the 
public violation of a treaty, an act that may trigger a range of sanctions, including re-
ciprocal noncompliance by adversely affected states. 
20 See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Inter-
state Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. Legal Stud. 303, 325–26 (2002). 
21 See, e.g., Caron, supra note 9, at 155; Richard A. Melanson, Human Rights and 
the American Withdrawal from the ILO, 1 Universal Hum. Rts. 43, 52–54 (1979); 
Steinberg, supra note 13, at 349. 
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Third, exit, unlike breach, is an internationally lawful act.22 To 
denounce a treaty, all that a state must do is to follow the often 
quite minimal conditions (usually procedural) that the treaty speci-
fies.23 This lawfulness has important consequences for the imposi-
tion of sanctions and for the distribution of a treaty’s burdens and 
benefits. In particular, exit enables a state to cease cooperation 
with other treaty parties while avoiding or at least reducing oppor-
tunities to be penalized for noncompliance. A state that properly 
follows the procedures for withdrawal from a treaty cannot be 
called upon to defend its failure to comply before a tribunal cre-
ated by that treaty, nor can it be targeted for treaty-authorized 
sanctions (although extra-treaty sanctioning mechanisms may be 
available—a point I explore below). Moreover, because no breach 
of the treaty has occurred, the remaining states are unable to exer-
cise their right under international law to engage in reciprocal acts 
of noncompliance.24 They can, of course, seek to exclude the with-
drawing state from the benefits of treaty membership. But their 
ability to do so depends upon the nature of the activities that the 
treaty regulates and whether they generate externalities that affect 
non-parties. 
Fourth, exit implicates domestic foreign affairs issues distinct 
from those raised by treaty breaches. A country’s failure to comply 
with its treaty commitments may stem from a variety of causes, 
ranging from simple inattention or inadvertence, to delays or re-
source constraints, to deliberate decisions of national policy. De-
pending on the explanation, such noncompliance can be attributed 
to legislators, executive branch officials, judges, private parties, or 
some combination thereof. A different set of actors, however, may 
be implicated in the formal and public denunciation of a treaty or 
22 The only two possible exceptions to this statement are (1) exit from treaties that 
expressly preclude or do not contain any provision for denunciation or withdrawal, 
and (2) exit from treaties that overlap with customary international law. I discuss 
these issues in greater detail below. 
23 International law treats as ineffective an exit attempt that does not meet these 
conditions. As a result, a state that ceases performance after such an attempt will con-
tinue to be considered as a party to the treaty, albeit one that has breached its interna-
tional obligations. 
24 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346 (specifying 
conditions for termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence 
of its breach). 
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the withdrawal from an intergovernmental organization.25 Where 
national legal systems create such cleavages, the exit-breach dis-
tinction may implicate the balance of power among governmental 
actors, raising important issues of domestic politics.26 
Fifth, the public, formal, and lawful qualities of exit have distinct 
consequences for a state’s reputation for compliance with interna-
tional law, a key factor in explaining interstate cooperation.27 On 
the one hand, the lawful, public, and generally infrequent nature of 
exit suggest that a denouncing state will suffer relatively little harm 
to its standing as a law abiding country—at least where it regularly 
participates in multilateral agreements. Exit clauses allow treaty 
parties to address openly the consequences of shifting domestic 
preferences or changed circumstances. A state that takes these is-
sues seriously, follows the specified procedures, and explains the 
basis for its actions projects a real (if somewhat backhanded) re-
spect for international rules, particularly where it is possible to pro-
fess adherence in theory but fail to comply in fact. On the other 
hand, where exit involves a politically salient act such as abandon-
ing a broad package of international obligations or membership in 
25 Consider the United States as an example. Congress can choose to violate a treaty 
obligation (at least one with domestic effects) by failing to enact the necessary imple-
menting legislation, refusing to fund activities or programs mandated by the agree-
ment, or (less commonly) enacting subsequent legislation directly inconsistent with 
the treaty. For treaty withdrawals—at least withdrawals that are valid under interna-
tional law—the conventional view is that the President may act without the approval 
of Congress. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva 
Conventions?, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 97, 154–57 (2004) (distinguishing between treaty 
withdrawals and treaty violations when analyzing the President’s authority under the 
Constitution and concluding that “[a]s long as a presidential decision to suspend, ter-
minate, or withdraw from a treaty complies with international law, the President’s ac-
tion is consistent with his constitutional duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed’”); Joshua P. O’Donnell, Note, The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Debate: 
Time for Some Clarification of the President’s Authority to Terminate a Treaty, 35 
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1601, 1625 (2002) (“The most widely-held modern view on the 
topic is that the President has the authority to terminate treaties, but it is still a highly 
controversial topic.” (internal quotations omitted)).  
26 For an account of the influence of American labor groups in precipitating the 
United States’ withdrawal from the ILO, see Melanson, supra note 21, at 47–54. 
27 For scholarship discussing the significance of reputation, see, e.g., George W. 
Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. 
Legal Stud. S95, S97 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of In-
ternational Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823, 1827 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, Compliance-
Based Theory]. 
HELFERBOOK 10/26/2005 2:04 PM 
2005] Exiting Treaties 1591 
 
an intergovernmental organization, it may do more pervasive and 
lasting damage to a state’s reputation than the breach of a specific 
treaty commitment.28 I provide a framework for reconciling these 
competing perspectives and for distinguishing the reputational con-
sequences of treaty exit and treaty breach later in this Article. 
Finally, exit interacts with a treaty’s other provisions to raise im-
portant issues concerning the form and structure of international 
agreements and institutions. Consider two preliminary examples. 
First, denunciation clauses function as an insurance policy, provid-
ing a hedge against uncertainty that allows a state to renounce its 
commitments if the anticipated benefits of cooperation turn out to 
be overblown. The existence of this insurance policy enables states 
to negotiate more expansive or deeper substantive treaty commit-
ments ex ante, although it also raises troubling opportunities for 
strategic action ex post. Second, treaty makers can use exit clauses 
to segregate states according to their tastes for cooperation, help-
ing to determine the optimal composition of a treaty’s member-
ship.29 At the negotiation stage, a restrictive denunciation clause or 
a total ban on exit helps to weed out states that are less serious 
about future compliance. After a treaty enters into force, however, 
a permissive exit provision provides a safety valve for treaty parties 
that—as a result of changes in treaty rules, domestic preferences, 
external events, or some combination of these factors—would oth-
erwise become habitual rule violators. As these examples illustrate, 
the decision of how constraining or capacious to make a denuncia-
tion or withdrawal clause raises difficult tradeoffs for treaty nego-
tiators. 
This brief overview of the distinctions between exit and breach 
suggests that exit is an important aspect of treaty negotiation, 
28 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 44(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343 (“A right of 
a party, provided for in a treaty or arising under article 56, to denounce, withdraw 
from or suspend the operation of the treaty may be exercised only with respect to the 
whole treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree.”). 
29 See Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental 
Treaty-making 195–220 (2003) (analyzing treaty participation, including the optimal 
number of member states, from a game theoretic perspective); George W. Downs et. 
al., Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism, 52 Int’l Org. 397, 398 (1998) (arguing 
that restricting membership to states committed to a particular cooperative goal and 
then adding less committed states over time permits “deeper” cooperation as com-
pared to broad, inclusive membership at the initial stages of treaty formation, fol-
lowed by amendments and protocols). 
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treaty practice, and treaty compliance—issues that lie at the heart 
of international governance. I explore these issues in the next two 
Parts of the Article. I identify the ways in which international law 
and IR scholars have failed to address the exit option or have 
elided key distinctions between exit and breach, thereby ignoring 
an important part of the treaty compliance equation. 
II.  RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES  
ON TREATY EXIT 
Exit clauses create discomfort for scholars and practitioners of 
international law. To a profession anxious to prove that nations 
obey international legal obligations, a state’s right to unilaterally 
abrogate its treaty obligations—often without substantive restraint 
or meaningful sanction—is not something to be advertised. In fact, 
major public international law treatises (and even most specialized 
studies of treaty law and practice) all but ignore exit or give the is-
sue only passing attention.30 This short shrift given to exit glosses 
over many consequential issues of treaty design and practice. 
A. Closing Exit 
The one treaty exit issue that has attracted considerable atten-
tion from international law scholars is closing exit. Scholars have 
long debated whether a state may lawfully denounce an interna-
tional agreement or withdraw from an intergovernmental organiza-
tion that does not expressly authorize denunciation or withdrawal.31 
30 For representative examples, see, e.g., Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public Interna-
tional Law 592 (6th ed. 2003) (devoting only a single page of a 715-page treatise to 
unilateral denunciation and stating in passing that “[a] treaty may of course specify 
the conditions of its termination, and a bilateral treaty may provide for denunciation 
by the parties”); 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise § 538, at 938 (H. 
Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (devoting only one paragraph in a three-volume trea-
tise to unilateral denunciation); Shabtai Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Trea-
ties, 1945–1986 (1989) [hereinafter Rosenne, Law of Treaties] (failing to discuss uni-
lateral withdrawal or denunciation). 
 I distinguish situations in which a state abrogates its treaty commitments in re-
sponse to the prior violation of the treaty by another party. International law scholars 
have extensively analyzed the legal rules that regulate such reciprocal treaty with-
drawals. See generally Mohammed M. Gomaa, Suspension or Termination of Treaties 
on Grounds of Breach (1996); Rosenne, Breach of Treaty, supra note 2.  
31 See, e.g., Egon Schwelb, Withdrawal from the United Nations: The Indonesian 
Intermezzo, 61 Am. J. Int’l L. 661, 661 (1967) [hereinafter Schwelb, Withdrawal from 
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Adopting a rule barring exit unless expressly permitted is highly 
consequential, turning the act of ratification into an irrevocable 
promise to cooperate (breach or renegotiation being the only other 
alternatives).32 
As explained below, however, these studies of whether “silent” 
treaties implicitly close exit suffer from several flaws. First, they 
have made little doctrinal headway, leaving the law in a state of 
flux. Second, the division among the studies largely reflects the au-
thors’ preferences as to whether the presumptive closure of exit is 
or is not normatively desirable. And third, the studies have di-
verted attention from the far more prevalent practice of drafting 
express treaty exit clauses that condition or restrict—but do not en-
tirely bar—unilateral denunciation or withdrawal. 
Scholars debating the implied closure of exit fall into two camps. 
The first sees unilateral treaty withdrawal as an inherent right of 
states that can be waived only by an express provision precluding 
exit or by other unequivocal evidence (such as in the travaux pré-
paratoires) that the parties intended to prevent withdrawals.33 The 
second group argues against exit, emphasizing the allegedly per-
petual character of certain intergovernmental organizations (such 
the United Nations]; Joseph H. H. Weiler, Alternatives to Withdrawal from an Inter-
national Organization: The Case of the European Economic Community, 20 Israel L. 
Rev. 282, 282–88 (1985); Kelvin Widdows, The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties 
Containing No Denunciation Clause, 53 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 83 (1982) [hereinafter 
Widdows, Unilateral Denunciation]. 
 Treaties that expressly preclude unilateral exit are uncommon. The treaty memori-
alizing the United States’ lease of Guantanamo Bay is a rare example. The lease ef-
fectively precludes Cuba’s unilateral withdrawal from the treaty. Treaty Defining Re-
lations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1682, 1683 (stating that 
the lease of Guantanamo Bay “shall continue in effect” “[u]ntil the two contracting 
parties agree to the modification or abrogation of” the lease, provided that the United 
States does not abandon the naval station).  
32 For a decision reaching precisely this conclusion, see U.N. Human Rights Com., 
53d Sess., General Comments under article 40, paragraph 4, of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 26(61), at 102 ¶¶ 1–5, 
U.N. Doc. A/53/40 (1998) [hereinafter General Comment] (expressing the view that it 
is not possible to denounce the ICCPR). 
33 See, e.g., György Haraszti, Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties 
264 (József Decsenyi trans., 1973). This position has its roots in the foundational 
statement by the Permanent Court of International Justice that “[t]he rules of law 
binding upon States . . . emanate from their own free will . . . . Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.” The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” 
(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). 
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as the United Nations and the European Union)34 or certain trea-
ties whose need for permanence is particularly acute (notably, 
peace agreements and treaties fixing disputed boundaries).35 Some 
scholars also make the broader claim that all implied withdrawals 
should be disfavored given their tension with the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda.36 
The drafters of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
sought to resolve these doctrinal rifts by creating a rebuttable pre-
sumption that states may not unilaterally exit from a treaty that 
lacks a denunciation or withdrawal clause.37 Yet, scholars writing 
after the Vienna Convention’s adoption in 1969 continue to contest 
such basic issues as whether the presumption accurately reflects 
customary law, the types of treaties whose nature implies a right to 
withdraw, and the textual and extra-textual evidence that must be 
marshaled to overcome the presumption and recognize a unilateral 
right to exit.38 
Far more useful than these largely unresolved doctrinal debates 
is the positive analysis these studies provide of how states behave 
when faced with a rule barring unilateral withdrawal from an inter-
governmental organization. The studies reveal that when the pres-
34 See Feinberg, supra note 12, at 215–17 (United Nations); Thomas M. Franck, Is 
the U.N. Charter a Constitution?, in Negotiating for Peace 95, 96 (Jochen Abr. 
Frowein et. al. eds., 2003) (United Nations); Weiler, supra note 31, at 284–87 (Euro-
pean Community). 
35 See J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of 
Peace 331 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); Oppenheim, supra note 30, § 538, 
at 938.  
36 See, e.g., David M. Galligan, Note, Wrapping Up the UNCLOS III “Package”: At 
Long Last the Final Clauses, 20 Va. J. Int’l L. 347, 382 (1980); see also Haraszti, supra 
note 33, at 268 (summarizing the views of scholars opposed to implied unilateral 
withdrawal). 
37 Article 56 of the Convention provides that an agreement: 
which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not pro-
vide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or with-
drawal unless: (a) It is established that the parties intended to admit the possi-
bility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) A right of denunciation or 
withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty. 
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 56(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345. Treaties that con-
tain express termination clauses are not governed by Article 56 and, in the absence of 
an express withdrawal clause, cannot be denounced prior to the time when the termi-
nation clause takes effect. See Haraszti, supra note 33, at 260–61. 
38 For an overview of these debates, see generally Widdows, Unilateral Denuncia-
tion, supra note 31. 
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sures to exit are sufficiently high, some states will quit the organi-
zation notwithstanding any international rule to the contrary. The 
withdrawal of North Korea from the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) in 1997; of Indonesia from 
the United Nations in 1965; of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Po-
land from UNESCO in the 1950s; and of the Soviet Union and 
eight of its Eastern European allies from WHO in the same period 
are prominent examples.39 
A more unexpected finding, however, is how withdrawing states 
respond after the pressures to exit have dissipated.40 In all of the 
examples above, the withdrawing states rejoined the organizations 
within a few years. And when they did so, they acquiesced in the 
organization’s re-characterization of their conduct as a temporary 
cessation of participation rather than a unilateral (and unlawful) 
withdrawal from membership. Indeed, states often bolster this re-
writing of history by paying a portion of the dues assessed against 
them during their erstwhile absence.41 
Scholars documenting this pattern of exit and return view it as 
compelling evidence that customary international law bans with-
drawals from treaties that do not contain an express exit clause.42 
But the pattern also suggests a different conclusion—that the clo-
sure of treaty exit, either expressly or by implication, may not be 
an optimal strategy to promote interstate cooperation. Yet interna-
tional legal scholars have all but ignored the effects of express de-
nunciation and withdrawal clauses on treaty-based cooperation. 
39 See Elizabeth Evatt, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the ICCPR: 
Denunciation as an Exercise of the Right of Self-Defence?, 5 Austl. J. Hum. Rts. 215, 
215–17 (1999); Schwelb, Withdrawal from the United Nations, supra note 31, at 666–
71; Widdows, Unilateral Denunciation, supra note 31, at 99–102; Feinberg, supra note 
12, at 204–11.  
40 The response by the remaining member states is also noteworthy. After the de-
nunciations of UNESCO described above, the United States successfully introduced 
an amendment to the organization’s constitution authorizing unilateral withdrawal. 
Feinberg, supra note 12, at 211. 
41 Michael Akehurst, Withdrawal from International Organisations, 32 Current Le-
gal Prob. 143, 146–49 (1979); Feinberg, supra note 12, at 205–11; Schwelb, Withdrawal 
from the United Nations, supra note 31, at 667–70. The retroactive payment of dues 
may function as a penalty for violating the implied rule against exit or it may signal a 
state’s willingness to reengage with an intergovernmental organization on new terms. 
42 See Akehurst, supra note 41, at 149–50. 
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B. Identifying Variation in Treaty Exit Clauses 
What forms do express denunciation and withdrawal clauses 
take? If these clauses are a topic of contention among treaty mak-
ers, we should expect to observe diversity in their structure. By 
contrast, if these provisions are mere boilerplate, as most interna-
tional law scholars have assumed, they should be identical or highly 
similar, at least among treaties in the same issue area. These are 
empirically testable propositions. Materials published by intergov-
ernmental organizations on “final clauses”43 provide a framework 
around which such empirical testing can be structured. The follow-
ing review of these heretofore unexamined sources of treaty prac-
tice reveals a significant degree of variation among treaty exit 
clauses.44 
In 1951, 1957, and 2003, the United Nations Office of Legal Af-
fairs published a Handbook of Final Clauses. The Handbook is a 
reference tool of exemplars from existing treaties designed to assist 
government officials in drafting multilateral agreements.45 The 
Council of Europe has employed a similar approach, adopting 
“model final clauses” to be included in treaties negotiated by its 
member states.46 In the ILO, final clauses have followed a template 
43 Final clauses are typically found at the end of a treaty and include topics such as 
“the settlement of disputes, amendment and review, the status of annexes, signature, 
ratification, accession, entry into force, withdrawal and termination, reservations, des-
ignation of the depositary, and authentic texts.” 2003 Handbook, supra note 4, at 1; 
see also U.N. Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Handbook, at 57, U.N. 
Sales No. E.02.V.2 (2001) (providing glossary definition of “final clauses”). 
44 A May 2005 search of Westlaw’s “Journals and Law Reviews” database found 
only two references to the Handbooks of Final Clauses described above. See Palitha 
T.B. Kohona, The United Nations Treaty Collection on the Internet—Developments 
and Challenges, 30 Int’l J. Legal Info. 397, 400 (2002); Palitha T.B. Kohona, Current 
Developments, The United Nations Treaty Collection on the Internet, 92 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 140, 141 (1998). 
45 U.N. Div. of Immunities and Treaties, Legal Dep’t, Handbook of Final Clauses, at 
v, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/1 (1951) [hereinafter 1951 Handbook]; U.N. Treaty Section, 
Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook of Final Clauses, at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/6 (1957) 
[hereinafter 1957 Handbook]; 2003 Handbook, supra note 4, at vi. See generally The 
Treaty Maker’s Handbook (Hans Blix & Jirina H. Emerson eds., 1973) (collecting ex-
amples of treaty texts, including texts of final clauses).  
46 Com. of Ministers, Council of Europe, Model Final Clauses for Conventions and 
Agreements Concluded within the Council of Europe (Feb. 1980), at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/ClausesFinales.htm [hereinafter 
Model Final Clauses].  
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set out in the first ILO convention concluded in 1919 and revised in 
1929.47 
A review of these guides to treaty making reveals that denuncia-
tion and withdrawal clauses cluster around six ideal types: (1) trea-
ties that may be denounced at any time; (2) treaties that preclude 
denunciation for a fixed number of years, calculated either from 
the date the agreement enters into force or from the date of ratifi-
cation by the state; (3) treaties that permit denunciation only at 
fixed time intervals; (4) treaties that may be denounced only on a 
single occasion, identified either by time period or upon the occur-
rence of a particular event; (5) treaties whose denunciation occurs 
automatically upon the state’s ratification of a subsequently-
negotiated agreement; and (6) treaties that are silent as to denun-
ciation or withdrawal.48 
Divergences also exist as to the procedures for notice of denun-
ciation, including the period of time that must elapse before a de-
nunciation takes effect, to whom notice must be given, and 
whether notice may be withdrawn.49 For some treaties, such as hu-
manitarian law agreements, the effective date of withdrawal is 
made contingent upon external events, such as the cessation of 
armed conflict.50 Among the many notice variations, the most 
common denunciation clause permits withdrawal only if the state 
provides advance notice of its decision to withdraw, sometimes 
47 See Possible Improvements in the Standard-setting Activities of the ILO, at 2, 7–
10, ILO Doc. GB.286/LILS/1/2 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/public 
/english/ standards/relm/gb/docs/gb286/pdf/lils-1-2.pdf [hereinafter Final Provisions of 
the International Labour Conventions]. 
48 1951 Handbook, supra note 45, at 119–36; 1957 Handbook, supra note 45, at 59–
73; Model Final Clauses, supra note 46, at art. f; 2003 Handbook, supra note 4, at 109–
11; see also Haraszti, supra note 33, at 246–50. 
49 Many of these divergences are noted in Haraszti, supra note 33, at 253–55. 
50 Common Article 63 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides that a de-
nunciation generally takes effect one year after the notification. E.g., Geneva Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, art. 63, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3152, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31, 68 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]. Yet, when a notice of denun-
ciation is “made at a time when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict[, de-
nunciation] shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and until after opera-
tions connected with the release and repatriation of the persons protected by the 
present Convention have been terminated.” 6 U.S.T. at 3152, 75 U.N.T.S. at 68. 
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with the additional condition that the treaty has been in force for a 
specified number of years.51 
The overwhelming majority of the denunciation and withdrawal 
clauses listed in these exemplary documents do not require a state 
to provide any justification for its decision to quit a treaty. To the 
contrary, notices of denunciation are generally short, stylized let-
ters of two or three paragraphs that simply inform the treaty de-
pository that a state is withdrawing from a particular agreement as 
of a specified date.52 
In a small number of agreements, however, a withdrawing state 
must explain its actions. Such explanations are particularly preva-
lent in arms control treaties.53 Most arms control agreements also 
restrict withdrawal to particular factual contexts, although they 
leave it to the denouncing state to determine whether such facts ex-
ist.54 States also provide justifications for denouncing international 
labor treaties. No ILO convention requires such statements, but in 
practice the ILO often requests, and governments often provide, 
explanations after consulting worker and employer representatives 
from that state.55 
51 See 1951 Handbook, supra note 45, at 119–36; 1957 Handbook, supra note 45, at 
59–73; Model Final Clauses, supra note 46, at art. f; 2003 Handbook, supra note 4, at 
109–11. 
52 See The Treaty Maker’s Handbook, supra note 45, at 114–16 (reproducing typical 
notices of withdrawal and denunciation). 
53 See Abram Chayes, An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 
85 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 957–58 (1972) [hereinafter Chayes, Arms Control Agreements]. 
A more recent example of this appears in the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction, which recognizes the right of exit but requires denouncing states to pro-
vide “a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.” Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction, art. 20 Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211. 
54  E.g., Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 
art. XV, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435 (recognizing the right to withdraw if either 
party “decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty 
have jeopardized its supreme interests” and requiring notice to the other party “of the 
extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme 
interests”); see also Chayes, Arms Control Agreements, supra note 53, at 957–58 
(“The question whether events are ‘extraordinary,’ whether they are ‘related to the 
subject matter of this Treaty,’ and whether they ‘have jeopardized [its] supreme inter-
ests’ are all referred exclusively to the unilateral decision of the withdrawing party.”). 
55 See Kelvin Widdows, The Denunciation of International Labour Conventions, 33 
Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1052, 1055 (1984) [hereinafter Widdows, ILO Denunciations] 
(discussing the ILO Governing Body’s unanimous adoption of a resolution requesting 
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The wide variety of denunciation and withdrawal clauses sug-
gests that governments derive a benefit from tailoring exit rules to 
particular types of treaties. In particular, the high degree of textual 
variation suggests that exit clauses may function as risk manage-
ment tools that allow governments to balance stability and continu-
ity of membership with the flexibility to tailor treaties to an uncer-
tain and changing world.56 The next Section provides a more 
detailed account of how exit clauses help states to manage risk. 
C. Facilitating Agreement Ex Ante While Deterring  
Opportunism Ex Post 
Uncertainty is a pervasive feature of international affairs. De-
nunciation clauses reduce uncertainty by giving states a low cost 
exit option if an agreement turns out badly. All other things being 
equal, such clauses encourage the ratification of a treaty by a larger 
number of states than would be prepared to ratify in the absence of 
such a clause.57 They may also enable states to negotiate deeper or 
broader commitments than would be attainable for treaties without 
unilateral exit.58 Taken together, these ex ante benefits of exit 
counsel negotiators to include broad and permissive withdrawal 
clauses in the treaties they draft.59 
that a state that has denounced an ILO convention provide “an indication of the rea-
sons which had led to its decision”). 
56 See Bilder, supra note 16, at ix–x; Raustiala, Form & Substance, supra note 17, at 
605–09. Bilder notes, however, that states “may include risk-management techniques 
in their agreements for reasons unrelated to any concern with risk,” such as routine, 
habit, a desire for “completeness[,] and conformity with other agreements . . . .” 
Bilder, supra note 16, at 20–21. 
57 See Harold J. Tobin, The Termination of Multipartite Treaties 202 (1933); see also 
Jenks, supra note 14, at 179–80 (stating that where “conditions are particularly liable 
to change,” the inclusion of a denunciation or termination clause by a treaty’s drafters 
“may materially assist those who are attempting to secure acceptance of a draft”). 
58 Cf. Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the 
GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 279 
(1991) (analyzing how escape clauses enable negotiators to overcome fear of future 
economic and political shocks and include more reciprocal concessions in trade trea-
ties). 
59 This incentive to include permissive exit rules ex ante is not altered even if states 
invoke exit clauses infrequently. Although a variety of costs (such as loss of voice and 
reputational harm) constrain exit as a political matter, a lawful method to abrogate 
treaty commitments remains useful to states for situations in which the benefits of 
noncompliance outweigh those costs. 
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Although the ex ante benefits of exit may be considerable, trea-
ties that permit easy denunciation also create ex post costs that 
may impede future cooperation. One such cost is that states will 
overuse exit clauses and invoke them (or credibly threaten to) 
whenever economic, political or other pressures make compliance 
costly or inconvenient.60 But the risks extend beyond such oppor-
tunistic behavior. Fearing that their treaty partners today may quit 
a treaty tomorrow, states that prefer to cooperate have a reduced 
incentive to invest the resources needed to comply with the agree-
ment.61 These incentives suggest that governments seeking to make 
treaties more durable should eliminate or restrict exit opportuni-
ties, a position directly contrary to the ex ante perspective favoring 
broad exit rights. 
These competing perspectives on the costs and benefits of exit 
reveal that a principal challenge facing treaty negotiators is to set 
optimal conditions on exit ex ante so as to deter opportunistic uses 
of exit clauses ex post after the treaty has entered into force.62 
Treaty restrictions that are too easy to satisfy will encourage self-
serving denunciations and lead to a breakdown in cooperation. Re-
strictions that are too onerous will discourage such behavior, but 
may prevent the parties from reaching agreement in the first in-
stance, or, if agreement is reached, may lead to widespread treaty 
violations if the costs of compliance rise unexpectedly.63 
60 Whether a state chooses to withdraw when faced with such pressures cannot be 
analyzed in isolation. For example, exit should be less frequent if the treaty permits 
reservations or authorizes noncompliance when circumstances fundamentally change. 
I discuss these issues below. 
61 See Swaine, Unsigning, supra note 7, at 2074 (“Where parties are free to exit a re-
lationship at any point and for any reason, they will under-invest in reliance—that is, 
fail to depend upon the relationship’s perpetuation in ways that might be efficient.”). 
62 Paul Stephan has pointedly framed the question: “[H]ow can we distinguish a na-
tion’s principled assertion of a right to withdraw from a relationship that has turned 
out badly from an opportunistic attempt to appropriate benefits that were created for 
a collective good?” Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, Ac-
countability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 
1555, 1583 (1999); see also Georg Ress, Ex Ante Safeguards Against Ex Post Oppor-
tunism in International Treaties: Theory and Practice of International Public Law, 150 
J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 279, 294–95 (1994). 
63 Cf. Sykes, supra note 58, at 297 (“The elimination of penalties for the avoidance 
of obligations would increase the propensity of signatories to make opportunistic use 
of [the escape clause in GATT].”). 
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If the ability of treaty negotiators to precisely calibrate optimal 
exit restrictions is questionable, it is further complicated by the fact 
that few treaties—at least outside the trade context—can credibly 
threaten to impose monetary penalties or other sanctions.64 As a 
result, optimal exit rules must deter opportunistic invocations of 
exit clauses by harnessing such compliance-inducing mechanisms as 
the reputational consequences of withdrawal, exclusions from 
benefits available to treaty members, and extra-treaty sanctions or 
incentives. In addition, what qualifies as an optimal restriction or 
condition is likely to vary with the number of parties to the agree-
ment, their relative power, the problems the treaty seeks to re-
solve, and the issue area in which it is situated. Before turning to a 
more detailed discussion of these issues, however, the next Section 
considers how frequently states actually invoke denunciation and 
withdrawal clauses to exit treaties. 
D. Examining the Frequency of Exit from Multilateral Treaties 
The conventional wisdom holds that treaty exits are extremely 
rare events that governments undertake only after exhausting all 
other avenues of persuasion and influence.65 The supposition that 
exit is an extraordinary act relies on anecdotal evidence of a few 
high-profile denunciations and withdrawals. No comprehensive 
empirical assessment of denunciation and withdrawal has ever 
been attempted. 
Systematic data on how frequently states exit international 
agreements is collected by the Treaty Sections of the United Na-
tions, the ILO, the Council of Europe, and other intergovernmen-
tal organizations. These offices maintain databases and archives of 
all so-called “treaty actions,” including ratifications, denunciations, 
64 Schwelb, Withdrawal from the United Nations, supra note 31, at 672 (“[T]he 
United Nations has no legal remedy to enforce its claim for continued membership of 
the state purporting to withdraw.”); cf. Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of Interna-
tional Agreements, 16 Eur. J. Int’l. L. (forthcoming 2005) (on file with the Virginia 
Law Review Association) (noting that unlike domestic law, in international legal sys-
tems, “[w]here sanctions are provided, they are often not severe, and often only pro-
spective”); Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 17, at 834–35 (arguing that the invoca-
tion of GATT’s escape clause is constrained by the obligation of the escaping state to 
compensate adversely affected GATT member or suffer an equivalent amount of re-
taliation). 
65 See, e.g., Galligan, supra note 36, at 384; Weiler, supra note 31, at 283. 
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and withdrawals from multilateral and bilateral agreements. Based 
on information collected from these treaty offices, as supplemented 
by other primary and secondary source materials, I have compiled 
a database of denunciations and withdrawals from multilateral 
treaties, from which I generate a variety of empirical snapshots that 
identify the incidence of exit from international agreements.66 
These snapshots are interesting in their own right. They reveal 
that denunciations and withdrawals are a regularized component of 
modern treaty practice—acts that are infrequent but hardly the iso-
lated or aberrant events that the conventional wisdom suggests. 
These portraits also provide the empirical groundwork for the 
theoretical and doctrinal analysis of exit that follows. 
Figure 1 illustrates the 1547 denunciations and withdrawals from 
all multilateral treaties registered with the United Nations in five-
year intervals from 1945 to 2004.67 It reveals a steady increase in the  
66 See Laurence R. Helfer, Excel Database of Denunciations from Multilateral 
Treaties (Sept. 5. 2005) (on file with author). The database is comprised of denuncia-
tions of and withdrawals from multilateral treaties that were notified to an intergov-
ernmental organization, a treaty depository, or the other treaty parties on or after 
January 1, 1945 and before January 1, 2005. The database includes denunciations and 
withdrawals notified during this fifty-year period with respect to treaties that were 
negotiated and opened for signature on or after January 1, 1900. 
 I obtained information on each entry in the database from the United Nations 
Treaty Section Documentum Database; the United Nations Treaty Collection; the 
Treaty Sections and Archives of the United Nations, the International Labor Organi-
zation, and the Council of Europe; the websites of these and other intergovernmental 
organizations; and numerous secondary sources, including but not limited to those 
cited in this Article. I am indebted to Palitha Kohona, Chief of the United Nations 
Treaty Section, for granting me access to the Documentum Database. 
 Whenever possible, I cross-checked the information in each entry for accuracy. I 
did not consider a denunciation or withdrawal to be reliably documented (and thus 
excluded it from the database) unless I was able to identify, at a minimum, the follow-
ing essential items of information: (1) year in which the treaty was concluded (and, 
whenever possible, the precise date that the treaty was opened for signature); (2) the 
country filing the notice of denunciation or withdrawal; (3) the year in which that 
country filed the notice of the denunciation or withdrawal (and, whenever possible, 
the precise date of the filing of the notice); and (4) the year in which the denunciation 
or withdrawal took effect (and, whenever possible, the precise date on which it took 
effect). I also excluded the following categories of entries from the database: (1) trea-
ties whose number of members I could not determine; (2) treaties or intergovernmen-
tal organizations that expressly preclude denunciation or withdrawal or do not con-
tain an express exit clause; and (3) notices of denunciation or withdrawal that were 
later withdrawn before their effective date. 
67 The United Nations also records denunciations and withdrawals from bilateral 
treaties, which are much higher than for multilateral agreements. However, I have ex-
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Figure 1: Total Denunciations and Withdrawals from Multilateral  
Treaties Registered with the United Nations, by Five-Year Period,  
1945–2004 (n = 1547) 
 
number of denunciations since the World War II, albeit with some 
variation in each five-year period.68 That upward movement can-
not, however, be understood in isolation. The increase in exits 
might simply reflect the rising number of states in the international 
community (including newly independent nations that emerged 
from colonialism in the 1960s), the increase in international treaty 
 
cluded bilateral treaties from the tables set forth above on theoretical and practical 
grounds. First, in the case of two-party agreements, the unilateral denunciation or 
withdrawal by one party also causes a termination of the treaty, a result that does not 
occur for multilateral treaties, which remain in force for the nonwithdrawing parties. 
Second, the information in the UN Documentum database on withdrawals is less 
comprehensive, and therefore less reliable, than the analogous information on multi-
lateral agreements. 
68 The databases do not provide sufficiently precise information to determine 
whether some nations quit multilateral treaties more frequently than others, either on 
absolute terms or in proportion to their total treaty ratifications. As a result, the evi-
dence is equally consistent with the claim that only a few states are responsible for 
most denunciations and withdrawals as with the assertion that exits are spread more 
or less evenly among the members of the international community. 
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making and associated ratifications, or both. To assess the potential 
relationship among these trends, I compared the number of denun-
ciations and withdrawals to the total number of multilateral treaty 
ratifications. 
Figure 2 compares the total number of ratifications of multilat-
eral treaties to the total number of denunciations and withdrawals,  
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Figure 2: Total Denunciations and Withdrawals (n = 1547) from, and  
Total Ratifications (n = 32,021) of, Multilateral Treaties Registered  
with the United Nations, by Five-Year Period, 1945–2004 
 
 
illustrating the treaty activity in each five-year period. Not surpris-
ingly, there have been far more ratifications of treaties (32,021) 
than denunciations and withdrawals (1547) since 1945. Figure 3 
shows the same data, but with exits in each five-year period ex-
pressed as a percentage of the cumulative ratifications registered 
by the United Nations from 1945 through the end of each period. 
This graph reveals that the rate of denunciations and withdrawals 
has held relatively constant or declined only slightly over the last 
fifty years, even after controlling for the large increase in treaty 
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ratifications and the emergence of new nations in the 1960s and 
1970s.  
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Figure 3: Total Denunciations and Withdrawals of Multilateral  
Treaties Relative to Cumulative Ratifications of Multilateral Treaties, 
by Five-Year Period, 1945–2004  
(denunciations and withdrawals = 1547; ratifications = 32,021) 
 
A different way to study the prevalence of exit is not by compar-
ing total ratifications and denunciations, but rather by examining 
individual treaties. Figures 4 and 5 analyze this information. 
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191 (3.53%)
5225 
(96.47%)
 
Figure 4: Percentage of Multilateral Treaties Concluded After 1945  
that Have Been Denounced at Least Once (black)  
(Total number of treaties = 5416) 
 
Figure 4 reveals that of the 5416 multilateral agreements con-
cluded after 1945, 191, or 3.5%, have been denounced at least 
once. In light of the 1547 denunciations filed during this same sixty-
year period, this small percentage suggests that a few multilateral 
agreements have been denounced by multiple states. This suggests 
that a few treaties turn out badly for many parties, resulting in 
group exits. 
Another revealing statistic is the timing of exit, in particular 
when denunciation and withdrawal occur relative to the date of a 
treaty’s adoption. The UN Treaty Section collects treaty-level data 
which reveals that older multilateral agreements are denounced 
more frequently than recently adopted treaties. 
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Figure 5: Multilateral Treaties Concluded After 1945  
that Have Been Denounced or Withdrawn from at Least Once;  
and Multilateral Treaties Concluded After 1945 that Have Never Been 
Denounced or Withdrawn from, by Date of Conclusion of Treaty 
(Total number of treaties = 5416) 
 
As Figure 5 illustrates, 37 of the 265 treaties (or 14%) negotiated 
in the first five years after World War II have received at least one 
denunciation or withdrawal. Thereafter, the number of “de-
nounced” agreements decreases gradually in absolute terms and 
more rapidly as a percentage of treaties concluded in each period. 
The correlation between a treaty’s age and the likelihood of one or 
more states denouncing it may indicate that states use exit to aban-
don treaties that have become outdated or moribund. It may also 
suggest that multilateral agreements may have an average “shelf 
life,” the expiration of which is signaled by the onset of denuncia-
tion or withdrawal. A more detailed study of these treaties there-
fore appears warranted. 
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E. Assessing the Political Salience of Exit from Multilateral Treaties 
The foregoing data suggests that exit is not merely a concern of 
overly cautious treaty negotiators nervous about the future. To the 
contrary, the data reveals that states quit multilateral treaties with 
a fair degree of regularity. To be clear, such invocations are only a 
small fraction of total treaty ratifications. But although infrequent, 
they are far more prevalent than international law scholars have 
previously asserted. Consider a revealing illustration: since 1975, a 
state has withdrawn from or denounced a multilateral agreement, 
on average, once every ten days.69 
Given this practice, why have scholars of international affairs 
largely ignored the practice of exiting treaties? Answering this 
question requires a more fine grained analysis. The data presented 
above treats each denunciation identically. From a deeper analyti-
cal perspective, however, such formal equality makes little sense. 
The political salience of a denunciation will vary according to fac-
tors such as (1) the subject matter of the treaty, (2) the identity and 
power of the withdrawing state in relation to the remaining treaty 
members, (3) the professed motivation for the state’s withdrawal, 
and (4) whether withdrawal precipitated the termination or rene-
gotiation of the treaty or was accompanied by the ratification of a 
revised agreement in the same subject area.70 
Seen from this perspective, some denunciations are likely to be 
more politically momentous than others and, as a result, attract 
greater attention from government officials, the news media, and 
academic commentators. It is not surprising, for example, that 
69 See supra Figure 1. The empirical evidence portrayed above undercounts the inci-
dence of exit in at least one significant respect. Treaty databases do not record threats 
of exit. These threats include instances in which a state informally publicized its intent 
to leave a multilateral agreement but never actually did so. They also include exit 
threats that precipitated the filing of a formal notice of denunciation or withdrawal 
that the state later withdrew before its effective date. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, A New Era 
in the Law of International Carriage by Air: From Warsaw (1929) to Montreal (1999), 
53 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 833, 836 (2004) (describing a strategy for treaty revision 
whereby the United States filed a notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention 
to precipitate change in aircraft liability rules and then withdrew the notice before it 
took effect after it had achieved its objectives). For this reason, the data significantly 
under-represents the prevalence of exit in international affairs, in particular its use as 
an instrument of voice in intergovernmental negotiating fora. 
70 This analysis builds upon my earlier treatment of treaty exit. See Helfer, Overle-
galizing, supra note 5, at 1887–88. 
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withdrawals (or threatened withdrawals) from treaties establishing 
intergovernmental organizations have received widespread public-
ity and analysis, particularly where those organizations aspire to 
universal membership or are intended to be perpetual.71 Similarly, 
denunciation of treaties central to maintaining international peace 
and security—including arms control agreements, such as the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 
and peace treaties terminating hostilities between two or more 
states—are likely to be viewed as more consequential. This is par-
ticularly the case where the withdrawing nation is an outlier as 
compared to other treaty parties, be it a global superpower such as 
the United States or a “rogue” state such as North Korea. 
By contrast, governments may consider other types of treaty ex-
its as raising few political or legal concerns. Plausible examples in-
clude denunciations carried out by a foreign ministry after culling 
through its catalogue of international agreements to identify out-
dated treaties that, while nominally still in force, are effectively 
moribund.72 In addition to these “housekeeping” denunciations, 
treaty withdrawals linked to the ratification of revised agreements 
are likely to fall below the political radar screen. For example, in 
the ILO and the International Maritime Organization, the ratifica-
tion of certain revising conventions or protocols triggers the auto-
matic or compulsory denunciation of earlier agreements relating to 
the same subject matter.73 Such paired treaty actions update a gov-
71 See supra Section II.A. 
72 See, e.g., Joint Standing Comm. on Treaties, Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Austl., Treaties Tabled in May and June 2003, Report 53, chap. 5, at 46 (Aug. 2003), avail-
able at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/mayjune2003/report.htm (last accessed 
May 17, 2005) (reporting analysis by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade that the “continued application of [three international labor] conven-
tions . . . serves no purpose” and that the proposed denunciations accord with the De-
partment’s “objective of ensuring that Conventions which are no longer relevant to 
our national circumstances do not form part of Australia’s regulatory structures” (in-
ternal quotations omitted)). 
73 See, e.g., Final Provisions of the Int’l Labour Conventions, supra note 47, at 10 
(discussing the practice of “automatic denunciation” of older ILO conventions that 
occur upon the ratification of “revising conventions”); Int’l Maritime Org., Protocol 
of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, art. 31, in Interna-
tional Conference on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connexion with the 
Carriage of Certain Substances by Sea, 1984, at 26, 42 (1985) (providing a mechanism 
for compulsory denunciation of the older convention).  
HELFERBOOK 10/26/2005 2:04 PM 
1610 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1579 
 
ernment’s legal obligations without materially diminishing its over-
all level of commitment. Similarly, a few Council of Europe trea-
ties supersede earlier agreements on the same subject by requiring 
ratifying nations to denounce the earlier agreements as a condition 
of membership.74 In these instances, exit is closer to a technical or 
ministerial act. Perhaps more importantly, denunciations and with-
drawals of this sort are fundamentally cooperative in nature, in 
contrast to unilateral exits not accompanied by the contemporane-
ous ratification of another, related treaty. 
Finally, the rationales (if any) a state offers to justify its decision 
unilaterally to withdraw from a multilateral agreement provide an 
important indicator of a denunciation’s political salience. Public 
pronouncements may reveal whether the state is seeking to renego-
tiate the treaty, to revise the mandate or procedures of an inter-
governmental organization it establishes, or to create a rival insti-
tution that more effectively serves its interests. 
Unfortunately, the treaty databases analyzed above rarely indi-
cate the motivation for a state’s denunciation or withdrawal. More 
fine grained historical analyses of individual treaties and individual 
acts of denunciation and withdrawal are required to unearth such 
rationales. Given the more than 1500 treaty exits (and the addi-
tional unknown instances of exit threats), the number of potential 
case studies appears daunting. As I explain in the next Part, how-
ever, situating exit within the IR literature on treaty-based coop-
eration and compliance helps to generate theoretically informed 
hypotheses that limit the number of plausible case studies and 
frame the parameters around which such studies should be struc-
tured. 
III. RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
PERSPECTIVES ON TREATY EXIT 
The foregoing review of treaty text and practice suggests that is-
sues of denunciation and withdrawal have been ignored or under-
emphasized by international legal scholars. A similar lack of atten-
tion to exit, however, also characterizes studies of state behavior by 
IR theorists. In the Sections below, I introduce the omitted vari-
able of exit into the political science literature and explore its con-
74 See Jörg Polakiewicz, Treaty-Making in the Council of Europe 37 (1999). 
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sequences for theories of international cooperation and compli-
ance. 
IR scholars view treaty exit and treaty breach as interchangeable 
examples of “defections” from international cooperation. This con-
flation ignores the distinctive institutional, legal, political, and re-
putational consequences of withdrawing from or denouncing an in-
ternational agreement. These consequences include the loss of 
membership and voice, restricted opportunities for imposing intra-
treaty and extra-treaty sanctions, and reduced harm to an existing 
reputation for treaty compliance where a state exits infrequently 
and can plausibly justify its decision to quit as a response to 
changed circumstances. 
After closely analyzing these and other similarities and differ-
ences between exit and breach, I introduce an exit option into dif-
ferent IR models of cooperation and compliance. I explore the 
functions of exit in collaboration and coordination games and as-
sess its relationship to treaty problem structures, such as agree-
ments regulating public goods and club goods. Throughout, I high-
light prescriptions for negotiators to structure denunciation and 
withdrawal clauses in ways that augment the cooperation-
enhancing functions of exit while diminishing the incentives for 
unilateral opportunism. 
A. Modeling Interstate Cooperation and Defection 
IR scholars who study treaties and international regimes often 
use game theory to model interstate cooperation problems. The 
most well known game is, of course, the Prisoners’ Dilemma, in 
which two players must decide whether to “cooperate” or to “de-
fect” in each round of play. The payoff structure of the game is 
fixed such that each player will rationally choose to defect rather 
than to cooperate. This dominant strategy leads to an equilibrium 
outcome of mutual defection, notwithstanding the fact that both 
players would have been better off had they chosen to cooperate.75 
75 For a review of the basic principles of game theory as applied to IR, see Moshe 
Hirsch, Game Theory, International Law, and Future Environmental Cooperation in 
the Middle East, 27 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 75, 78–94 (1998); Duncan Snidal, Ra-
tional Choice and International Relations, in Handbook of International Relations 
73, 74–76 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002). 
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The classic, two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma makes several as-
sumptions. The players are unitary, rational actors who seek to 
maximize their individual welfare. In addition, the payoffs of the 
game are fixed in advance and are known to both players, who 
must either cooperate or defect in each round of play.76 By relaxing 
one or more of these assumptions, IR scholars have modified the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma to reflect the realities of interstate relations 
more accurately. They have, for example, developed games for 
multiple players (the so-called n-Prisoners’ Dilemma), games that 
permit repeated rounds of play (iteration), and games that allow 
communication among the participants. These modifications mir-
ror the cooperation-enhancing effects of international agreements 
and institutions. They enable the players (that is, the treaty parties) 
to overcome the incentive to defect by repeated contacts with 
other players, increasing access to information, mediating disputes, 
and sanctioning noncompliance.77 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma has played a central role in helping IR 
scholars to explain why states cooperate under conditions of anar-
chy. But its assumption that players face a binary choice between 
“cooperation” and “defection” has produced a problematic, if un-
intended, result. By restricting state behavior to these two options, 
scholars have elided the distinction between breach of treaty obli-
gations on the one hand and denunciation or withdrawal from trea-
ties on the other.78 
76 See Friedrich Kratochwil, Norms Versus Numbers: Multilateralism and the Ra-
tionalist and Reflexivist Approaches to Institutions—a Unilateral Plea for Communi-
cative Rationality, in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institu-
tional Form 443, 447 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993) [hereinafter Multilateralism 
Matters] (identifying explicit and implicit assumptions in game theoretic explanations 
of international cooperation). 
77 See generally Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in 
the World Political Economy (1984). 
78 Duncan Snidal has also critiqued the standard game theoretic assumption that 
states face only a dichotomous choice in each round of play. Duncan Snidal, Coordi-
nation versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and 
Regimes, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 923, 927–28 (1985). He does not, however, consider 
the consequences of including exit as one of the multiple options available to states. 
See id. 
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B. Conceptual Confusions: Conflating Exit and Breach 
Evidence of this conceptual confusion is easy to identify. Many 
scholars equate “defection” with breach of a state’s treaty com-
mitments, in the sense of cheating or free riding on the cooperative 
efforts of other states without incurring the corresponding burdens. 
This association between defection and noncompliance is some-
times made expressly; but it also is implied from the fact that a 
state aggrieved by its treaty partner’s defection may punish the de-
fecting state by failing to cooperate in the next round of play.79 For 
other commentators, by contrast, treaty defections include any 
form of non-cooperative behavior, including noncompliance, re-
fusal to ratify, and formal treaty withdrawals.80 
That scholars have used the same label to describe two distinct 
types of state behavior suggests that something is amiss. Specifi-
cally, conflating exit and breach ignores the many ways in which 
the act of violating a treaty differs—institutionally, legally, politi-
cally, and reputationally—from the act of denouncing it. The Sec-
tions below identify and analyze the contrasting features of exit 
and breach, elaborating upon the preliminary discussion of those 
distinctions in Part I above. 
1. Treaty Membership and Voice 
Retaining or relinquishing treaty membership is one key differ-
ence between breach and exit. First consider breach. A state’s fail-
ure to comply with its treaty obligations has no necessary nexus to 
the mechanisms of cooperation and influence available to treaty 
79 See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International 
Law, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 679, 700–01 (2003) (describing “possible actions” in game the-
ory as “cooperate/comply or defect/breach”); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative 
States: International Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 
Va. J. Int’l L. 839, 842 (2002) (equating “defection” with “cheating”). 
80 See, e.g., Lisa L. Martin, The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism, in 
Multilateralism Matters, supra note 76, at 91, 101–02 (equating defection with both 
private cheating and public signaling about future actions); John K. Setear, An 
Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and 
International Law, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 139, 191 (1996) [hereinafter Setear, Iterative 
Perspective] (“A decision to participate in negotiations, to sign, to ratify, or to comply 
after entry into force is cooperative. A failure to participate, sign, ratify, or comply is 
equivalent to the ‘defect’ option in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.”); see also Guzman, 
Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 27, at 1844 (equating defection with “non-
cooperative behavior”). 
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members. Treaty breaches are highly varied. They may affect only 
a single treaty article, a handful of obligations, or the entire treaty. 
In none of these examples, however, does noncompliance necessar-
ily result in termination of the defaulting state’s membership. Even 
in the most extreme cases—material breach or repudiation—the 
non-breaching states are entitled to terminate their relationship 
with the breaching state, but abrogation occurs only if all parties 
agree to do so.81 
The decision to exit unilaterally from a treaty, however, has far 
more significant consequences for institutionalized cooperation 
within the framework of that treaty. A nation that exits is no longer 
eligible to send delegates to treaty conferences and negotiating ses-
sions, to participate in the treaty’s dispute settlement mechanisms, 
or to appoint one of its nationals to the treaty’s information-
sharing, monitoring, or dispute settlement bodies. It is thus fore-
closed from the mechanisms of voice that the treaty establishes, 
mechanisms that can be used to influence both the parties’ current 
behavior as well as future rounds of international rulemaking.82 In 
the parlance of game theory, a state that denounces a treaty—
unlike a state that breaches one—is no longer in the same position 
to participate as a “player” in future “rounds” of play.83 
81 In the case of multilateral treaties, the Vienna Convention provides that a “mate-
rial breach” by one of the parties entitles—but does not require— “[t]he other parties 
by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or 
to terminate it either: (i) [i]n the relations between themselves and the defaulting 
State, or (ii) [a]s between all the parties.” Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 60(2), 
1155 U.N.T.S. at 346. The Convention defines material breach as either “[a] repudia-
tion of the treaty” or “[the] violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of 
[its] object or purpose.” Id. art. 60(3), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346. Treaty violations that do 
not rise to the level of material breaches do not trigger the right of the remaining par-
ties to terminate the breaching party’s membership. 
82 Cf. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 
Colum. L. Rev. 1492, 1562 n.296 (2004) (“Refusing to cooperate, for example, may 
sacrifice a nation’s entitlement to continue benefiting from the institution’s previous 
good works, or result in an international standard that is worse than the (admittedly 
imperfect) standard likely if some influence is maintained.”). 
83 The degree to which a withdrawing state suffers a diminution of voice may depend 
on whether the treaty is a free standing agreement or embedded within a larger insti-
tutional structure. A state that denounces an international labor convention retains its 
membership in the ILO and its institutionalized methods of lawmaking and coopera-
tion. Conversely, a state that withdraws from the ILO continues to be bound by all of 
the international labor conventions that it has ratified, although it no longer partici-
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Debates over whether the United States should participate in 
humanitarian law, environmental protection, and oceans law trea-
ties illustrate the benefits of participation and the risks of non-
membership and highlight the distinctions between breach and 
exit. Before President George W. Bush’s decision to “unsign” the 
treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), Am-
bassador David Scheffer defended President Clinton’s decision to 
sign the agreement as a way to enhance American influence with 
other treaty parties and shape the ICC’s future development. As a 
signatory, Ambassador Scheffer argued, the United States “would 
be in a much stronger position to influence the entire establish-
ment of the ICC and the decision-making within the Assembly of 
States Parties” than if it had remained outside the treaty regime.84 
Although signing but not (or not yet) ratifying a treaty confers a 
kind of quasi-membership status, it is an inferior position from 
which to influence the behavior of other states and the treaty’s ne-
gotiation, rulemaking, and dispute settlement processes.85 Observ-
ers of environmental protection agreements make this point ex-
pressly. For example, in the case of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (“CBD”), which the United States has only signed, “the 
US delegation is at a disadvantage because the US Congress has 
not yet ratified the Convention and therefore the US is only an ob-
server at the CBD.”86 The Department of Defense used similar ar-
guments to urge the United States to join the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea. As Harold Koh has written, “U.S. 
military officials have now apparently concluded that the U.S. fail-
ure to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty impinges on U.S. naval op-
erations by barring American officials from full participation in de-
pates in these mechanisms. See Nicolas Valticos & Geraldo W. von Potobsky, Inter-
national Labour Law 33–34 (1995). 
84 David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 47, 58 (2002). 
85 There is no similar quasi-membership status available to exiting states, which 
move from full membership to non-membership as a result of an act of denunciation. 
86 Michel Petit et al., Why Governments Can’t Make Policy: The Case of Plant Ge-
netic Resources in the International Arena, at 36, GFAR Doc. GFAR/00/20-03 (May 
15, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).  
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liberations over worldwide ocean policies, fishery management is-
sues and sea transit talks.”87 
Of course, membership has its burdens as well as its privileges. 
In many treaties and intergovernmental organizations, members 
must provide financial contributions to support facilities, staff, and 
operations. Indeed, several states that withdrew or purported to 
withdraw from the ILO, UNESCO, and WHO justified their de-
partures in part on the basis of their inability or unwillingness to 
pay for the organizations’ activities.88 By contrast, breaching parties 
do not eschew their financial support obligations, although the 
failure to pay dues can itself rise to the level of an international law 
violation. 
2. Intra-treaty Sanctions 
Lumping exit and breach together under the single heading of 
defection also ignores a second distinction—the different sanction-
ing mechanisms that each action triggers. According to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and the customary interna-
tional law rules of state responsibility, a state’s breach of its treaty 
commitments authorizes a range of responses by other states ad-
versely affected by that breach. The responses permitted depend 
upon the nature of the violation. For more serious treaty breaches, 
an aggrieved state may engage in reciprocal acts of noncompliance 
or, in extreme cases, abrogate the treaty in whole or in part in rela-
tion to the breaching state.89 For minor deviations from compli-
ance, less extensive retaliations are permitted, including acts that 
would otherwise violate international law but for the earlier unlaw-
ful act.90 
87 Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law 
Home, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 623, 641 n.82 (1998).  
88 See Ghebali, supra note 12, at 110–13 (withdrawals from ILO); Feinberg, supra 
note 12, at 204–11 (withdrawals from UNESCO and WHO). The truth of such asser-
tions is uncertain, however, given that the states ultimately paid a portion of their 
back dues upon rejoining the organizations. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
89 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346 (specifying 
conditions for termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence 
of its breach). 
90 See Elisabeth Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Counter-
measures 89–93 (1984); John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Ration-
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Neither the Vienna Convention nor the rules of state responsi-
bility authorize such actions to be undertaken against a state that 
has denounced a treaty according to its terms.91 To the contrary, a 
state that imposes such sanctions or penalties may itself violate the 
agreement, triggering a fresh round of reciprocal noncompliance 
by other aggrieved treaty parties. 
Nor are the remaining treaty members or intergovernmental of-
ficials likely to misperceive an act of exit as an act of breach, or 
vice versa. Most exit provisions are unambiguously drafted and re-
quire little or no justification from the withdrawing state. Except 
for the comparatively small number of agreements that do not con-
tain express exit clauses, it would be exceedingly difficult for treaty 
parties to contest the legality of a unilateral withdrawal, thereby 
creating a plausible dispute about compliance that would enable 
them to sanction the withdrawing state. 
More importantly, the remaining treaty parties also have a self-
interested reason to avoid sanctioning the denouncing state. Re-
fraining from penalizing exiting nations preserves a clear distinc-
tion between exit and breach that other parties may wish to exploit 
in the future. Exit clauses are drafted for the express purpose of 
authorizing conduct that would be a violation of the treaty in the 
absence of withdrawal.92 The prevalence of such clauses and their 
permissive structure suggest that governments benefit from pre-
alist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the 
Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1, 69 (1997). 
91 See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 70, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 349 (“[A] 
State [that] denounces or withdraws from a multilateral treaty” is released “from any 
obligation further to perform the treaty . . . from the date when such denunciation or 
withdrawal takes effect.”). 
92 The result is more complicated in the case of treaties that embody or codify cus-
tomary international law. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 50, art. 63, 6 
U.S.T. at 3152, 75 U.N.T.S. at 68 (providing that denunciation of humanitarian law 
treaties does not “impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain 
bound to fulfil [sic] by virtue of the principles of the law of nations”). A state that 
withdraws from such a treaty cannot withdraw from the customary law rules that un-
derlie it unless the state has also persistently objected to the formation of the custom 
(an unlikely prospect given its ratification of a treaty that embodies that custom). As a 
result, a state that acts contrary to such a treaty after denouncing it may violate cus-
tomary international law, triggering a range of permitted responses by other states 
aggrieved by the violation. See Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Co-
gens as Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 Am. J. Int’l L. 946, 957 
(1967). 
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serving a relatively unencumbered right to walk away from trea-
ties. Indeed, if states regarded the consequences of denunciation as 
equivalent to those of breach, there would be little point in drafting 
rules to specify the procedures and conditions under which denun-
ciation may or may not occur. 
3. Extra-treaty Sanctions 
Skeptics of international rules and institutions may object to any 
distinction between exit and breach premised upon the responses 
that international law itself authorizes. According to these skeptics, 
even a state that “plays by the rules” and denounces a treaty ac-
cording to its terms may be subjected to coercion, threats, or other 
unfriendly acts by states opposed to its denunciation. Such states 
may use a variety of methods—such as trade sanctions, withholding 
military aid or financial assistance, or threats to terminate other 
cooperative relationships—to dissuade the denouncing state from 
leaving or to force it to reconsider its decision to withdraw. Signifi-
cantly, all of these strategies are external to the treaty from which 
the state has exited. 
Differentiating exit from breach solely on the basis of intra-
treaty sanctions is admittedly incomplete. But the use of extra-
treaty sanctions and pressure tactics cannot be presumed. For ex-
ample, coordinating sanctions against a withdrawing state poses 
significant collective action problems. Not all treaty parties may 
agree on the legality or wisdom of imposing such sanctions. And 
even if several states conclude that sanctions are appropriate, if 
more than one state has plausible claim to sanction the exiting na-
tion, each party will prefer that some other state undertake the 
costs of imposing the sanction. In the absence of treaty-based rules 
to resolve these conflicts, sanctions may not be imposed or may be 
too weak to affect the target state’s behavior.93 
93 Intra-treaty sanctions and acts of reciprocal noncompliance also raise collective 
action problems. See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sover-
eignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 63–67 (1995); Frisch-
mann, supra note 79, at 735 n.166. But such problems are more severe in the case of 
extra-treaty sanctions, which lack any institutions and rules to determine the need for 
and legality of sanctions, their type and amount, and the mechanisms for imposing 
them. 
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Given these constraints, we might expect extra-treaty sanctions 
to be imposed chiefly by powerful countries like the United States, 
either unilaterally or acting through institutions over which they 
exert significant influence. Hegemons often have greater resources 
or other advantages that reduce the costs of imposing sanctions 
and help to overcome collective action problems. Yet even for 
powerful countries, both the ability and the incentive to sanction 
will vary from issue to issue and from state to state.94 
For particularly high-stakes issues or treaties that are deeply 
nested within other international regimes and institutions, exit is 
unlikely to deter the imposition of extra-treaty sanctions. This is 
because the act of quitting the treaty does not disengage the with-
drawing state from the legal and political environments in which 
the treaty is embedded. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(“NPT”) provides an apt illustration. North Korea threatened to 
withdraw from the NPT in 1993 and in fact withdrew ten years 
later. Likening the country’s tactics to “nuclear blackmail,” the Di-
rector General of the International Atomic Energy Agency re-
cently stated that North Korea’s denunciation of the NPT did not 
remove it from international scrutiny. 
You read a lot that a country can just walk out of the NPT with-
out any ramification; I think that’s wrong because they can walk 
out from their treaty obligation, but that does not get them off 
the hook of the Security Council . . . . And if the Security Coun-
cil . . . finds a country’s withdrawal from the NPT a precursor to a 
situation that could threaten international peace and security, or 
in itself threaten international peace and security, then the Secu-
rity Council can intervene and intervene early on.95 
94 Cf. Barrett, supra note 29, at 73 (“[A theory of international cooperation] should 
not assume that a hegemon has both the wherewithal and the incentive to sustain co-
operative outcomes under any and all circumstances. Nor should it assume that other 
countries will necessarily defer to the hegemon.”). 
95 Interview by Emma Belcher with Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General, 
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency (Dec. 2, 2003), in 28 Fletcher F. World Aff. 29, 37, 39 
(2004). For a discussion of North Korea’s aborted withdrawal from the NPT in 1993 
and analysis of whether NPT obligations survive denunciation, see Antonio F. Perez, 
Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Withdrawal and the 
Continuing Right of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 34 Va. J. Int’l 
L. 749, 797 (1994). 
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Few treaty denunciations, however, rise to the level of such global 
threats or so seriously endanger the security interests of other 
countries. For more prosaic treaty withdrawals, embedding an 
agreement within a broader political and institutional framework 
may actually deter hegemons from imposing extra-treaty sanctions, 
either because related agreements make such actions legally im-
permissible or because geostrategic factors make them politically 
implausible. 
The sanctions policy the United States has adopted against 
whale-hunting nations provides a telling example. On more than a 
dozen occasions, pro-whaling states have withdrawn or threatened 
to withdraw from the International Convention for the Regulation 
of Whaling (“ICRW”) to protest moratoria or restrictions on 
commercial whaling adopted by an ICRW Commission.96 The 
United States, which opposes whaling, has enacted domestic laws 
that authorize unilateral trade sanctions or restrict fishing rights in 
American waters against any state that fails to adhere to the Com-
mission’s regulations. Significantly, these laws apply to countries 
that never ratified the ICRW or have formally withdrawn from the 
treaty.97 Recent studies of the whaling regime conclude, however, 
that no whaling state has ever been sanctioned by the United 
States for failing to comply with ICRW regulations.98 Scholars at-
tribute this fact to the harm sanctions would cause to American in-
terests, and to the more consequential geopolitical and economic 
relationships that the United States maintains with pro-whaling na-
tions such as Russia and Japan.99 The more important theoretical 
96 See Barrett, supra note 29, at 160–61. 
97 See id. at 69–72. 
98 Id. at 70–71; Elizabeth R. DeSombre, Domestic Sources of International Envi-
ronmental Policy: Industry, Environmentalists, and U.S. Power 208–13 (2000); see 
also Ronald B. Mitchell & Patricia M. Keilbach, Situation Structure and Institutional 
Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange, 55 Int’l Org. 891, 908 (2001) (noting 
that threats by the United States to reduce fishing rights or restrict fish imports ini-
tially deterred commercial whaling by non-member states, but that such threats have 
become less effective over time, and that “Iceland has withdrawn [from the ICRW], 
Norway has recommenced commercial whaling, and Japan and Russia have threat-
ened to do both”). 
99 See Barrett, supra note 29, at 69–71; Richard Ellis, Men and Whales 440 (1991); 
see also Steve Charnovitz, Encouraging Environmental Cooperation Through the 
Pelly Amendment, 3 J. Env’t & Dev. 3, 17–19 (1994) (noting a “pattern of declining 
effectiveness” in threats by United States against whaling states). 
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conclusion, however, is that extra-treaty sanctions can be difficult 
to impose, even for powerful countries such as the United States. 
These contrasting examples of extra-treaty sanctions against 
withdrawing states reveal the close relationship between law and 
power in international affairs. But they also suggest a more conse-
quential insight—that the distinction between intra-treaty re-
sponses to breach and extra-treaty responses to exit is a meaningful 
one that must be addressed by any robust theory of international 
cooperation. 
4. Reputational Consequences 
Material sanctions can be an important inducement to comply 
with treaty commitments. Even where sanctions are weak or diffi-
cult to impose, however, a state’s concern with reputation acts as 
an independent inducement for a state to adhere to its interna-
tional obligations. At the highest level of generality, the link be-
tween reputation and compliance is simply stated: If a state fails to 
comply with its treaty commitments, other states will be reluctant 
to enter into future agreements with that state or will demand addi-
tional assurances or concessions before doing so.100 
What are the reputational consequences of treaty exit and how 
do they compare to those of treaty breach? The most basic distinc-
tion is that a withdrawing state is actually adhering to the treaty’s 
rules by publicizing its decision to exit prospectively.101 Given the 
generally weak mechanisms available to monitor and enforce com-
pliance with treaty obligations, breach is often a plausible alterna-
tive to exit. The choice to denounce, therefore, together with any 
explanation the state offers to justify its decision, may signal an in-
tent to “play by the rules” of future treaties as well. As a result, the 
harm to the withdrawing state’s reputation as a law abiding nation 
may be minimal. 
100 See Guzman, Compliance Based-Theory, supra note 27, at 1849–50. Recent work 
on the role of reputation in international law suggests that states do not have a single, 
blanket reputation for compliance, but many reputations, which vary by issue area or 
even by specific treaty. See Downs & Jones, supra note 27, at S102–09. 
101 This statement assumes that the treaty contains an exit clause and that the state 
follows its procedural rules regarding the notice and timing of withdrawal. For a dis-
cussion of the unsettled legality of exiting from treaties that do not contain an express 
withdrawal or denunciation clause, see supra Section II.A. 
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In practice, however, the reputational differences between exit 
and breach are more complex and require a more nuanced analy-
sis. Three variables in particular stand out in assessing exit’s dis-
tinctive reputational effects: (1) the frequency of denunciation and 
withdrawal; (2) the relationship between entering and exiting trea-
ties; and (3) the risks of opportunism in light of the pervasive un-
certainty of international affairs. I address each of these issues in 
the discussion that follows. 
The empirical evidence reviewed above demonstrates that exit-
ing from multilateral agreements is an infrequent event compared 
to treaty ratifications. Politically salient exits are likely to be even 
more rare. Explaining these behavioral patterns requires analyzing 
exit in tandem with why states enter into treaties in the first in-
stance. 
First, adopting an ex ante perspective, states might simply de-
cline to join multilateral treaties that do not serve their interests or 
for which they can envision future political or economic shocks 
that will later force them to withdraw. States might thus select 
themselves into membership only in those treaties that they intend 
to honor.102 Second, certain categories of treaties contain modest 
commitments or weak monitoring mechanisms.103 For these “shal-
low” treaties, ratification is largely inconsequential and exit largely 
unnecessary.104 In the former case, the treaty requires a state to do 
nothing more than it would otherwise do;105 in the latter, a state can 
102 See Barrett, supra note 29, at 160. 
103 Many international environmental agreements are shallow, that is, they do little 
more than codify the status quo. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global: 
Toward the Transformation of International Environmental Law, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. 
Rev. 241, 270–71 (1995); Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in Interna-
tional Regulatory Cooperation, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387, 392 (2000) [hereinafter 
Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness]. Many human rights conventions also have 
weak monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human 
Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 1935, 1938, 2008 (2002). 
104 The statement above describes the extreme case. Some international agreements 
are moderately shallow, requiring modest changes to national laws and practices that 
can be monitored, albeit imperfectly, by treaty review bodies and reporting and in-
formation-sharing mechanisms. 
105 Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness, supra note 103, at 391–92; see also Up 
in Smoke, News Journal (Wilmington, Del.), Mar. 1, 2005, at A8, available at 2005 
WLNR 3159219 (criticizing the United States’ failure to ratify the Framework Con-
vention for Tobacco Control and stating that the country “could garner a lot of inter-
national favor simply by agreeing with the treaty to do what it already does”).  
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violate the treaty without being caught. In either case, a state has 
little to gain either by declining to ratify or by exit.106 
Stated more broadly, the theoretical conjecture I advance is that 
where denunciation and withdrawal are infrequent events, their 
reputational effects will more closely resemble those of declining to 
ratify a treaty than they will the reputational consequences of 
breach.107 Further, where a state’s non-entry and exit of multilateral 
treaties are both uncommon occurrences, the reputational costs of 
those few non-ratifications and withdrawals that do occur should 
be modest, all other things being equal. By participating in numer-
ous multilateral agreements and by remaining a member of those 
agreements until they are terminated or revised by all treaty par-
ties, a state signals its overall commitment to multilateral coopera-
tion with other states—and thus bolsters its reputation as a coop-
erator—even if it declines to participate in certain treaty regimes in 
exceptional or politically inconsequential cases. 
By contrast, multiple refusals to ratify—as with multiple denun-
ciations of previously ratified agreements—signal a state’s propen-
sity to eschew multilateral cooperation and carry much the same 
reputational cost as a track record of violating treaty commit-
ments.108 This effect is likely to be especially pronounced where the 
non-ratifying or exiting state participated in the negotiating con-
ferences that helped to shape the treaties’ form and substance. 
The unilateralist behavior of the United States provides a salient 
example. The United States has recently refrained from ratifying—
or has withdrawn from—numerous multilateral agreements that 
are widely ratified by other nations and that it at one time champi-
oned. These treaties include the Kyoto Protocol, the Rome Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court, the Landmines Con-
106 Future studies may usefully explore the relationship between depth of treaty 
commitments and exit, for example by examining whether treaties with more onerous 
obligations are denounced more frequently than those whose commitments are shal-
low. 
107 I discuss the analytical insights of explicitly linking treaty entry and treaty exit is-
sues in greater detail below. 
108 I exclude from this statement denunciations and withdrawals that are formally or 
informally linked to the ratification of an updated or revised treaty within the same 
regime. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73. Such exits are fundamentally coop-
erative in nature and do not signal an intent to avoid multilateral interactions with 
other nations. 
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vention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, and, most recently, the Framework Convention for 
Tobacco Control and the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations.109 By remaining outside these treaties 
through non-entry or exit, the United States has, according to 
many observers, cast doubt on its commitment to multilateral co-
operation.110 
A significant part of the negative reaction to the United States’ 
non-participation in these treaty regimes can be attributed to re-
sentment of its unique status as a world hegemon and the dispro-
portionate military and economic power it possesses relative to 
other nations.111 But another component of the dissatisfaction re-
lates to the perception that the United States, by failing to partici-
pate in treaty after treaty, is reaping the benefits of cooperation by 
others without incurring any corresponding burdens. Stated an-
other way, if the world is less violent, less polluted, and more pro-
tective of individual freedom as a result of these agreements, it is 
not because of any assistance from the United States. This suggests 
another dimension for comparing the differential reputational ef-
fects of treaty exit and treaty breach—opportunistic behavior in re-
lation to other treaty parties. 
Opportunistic exit takes a variety of forms, the reputational con-
sequences of which will be similar to opportunistic breach in some 
instances but quite distinct in others. Consider first temporal op-
109 See Wade Boese, U.S. Will Not Join Landmine Treaty; Position on Fissile Mate-
rial Cutoff Pact Uncertain, Arms Control Today, Mar. 2004, at 42; Curtis A. Bradley, 
U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty, ASIL In-
sights (May 2002), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm; Chester Brown, 
The Kyoto Protocol Enters into Force, ASIL Insights (Mar. 2005), at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insights050301.html; Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It 
Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16; Up in 
Smoke, supra note 105. 
110 See, e.g., John F. Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in Interna-
tional Affairs 4–9 (2004); Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971, 1978 (2004); Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in In-
ternational Law, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 195, 218 (2004). 
111 See generally United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law 
(Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003); Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International 
Law, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 843, 846 (2001). 
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portunism, which arises where the parties’ performance is non-
synchronous and one party withdraws from the treaty after its 
partners have performed but before its own performance has been 
completed.112 The risk that Iran will withdraw from the NPT pro-
vides an apt and timely example. Since ratifying the treaty, Iran has 
received technological assistance in exchange for dismantling its 
nuclear weapons program. But the treaty contains a potential de-
sign flaw: “it permits countries to build nuclear programs for 
peaceful purposes and then, with 90 days notice, pull out of the 
treaty. That means [Iran] can develop facilities under the treaty, 
then shift them to weapons programs.”113 
Careful drafting of exit clauses can reduce or prevent temporally 
opportunistic exit. In bilateral investment treaties, for example, the 
risk of opportunism arises because invested assets are relation-
specific, enabling the host country to expropriate the assets with lit-
tle risk of the investor moving the assets elsewhere.114 In theory, the 
host country could denounce the treaty after the investments had 
been made and then expropriate the investments without violating 
its treaty obligations. To reduce this risk, many investment treaties 
bar denunciation for ten years after the treaty enters into force and 
stipulate that investor protections remain in effect for previously 
invested assets.115 These clauses, drafted at the insistence of inves-
tor countries, deter opportunistic denunciation by governments of 
host countries. 
112 See Richard Morrison, Efficient Breach of International Agreements, 23 Denv. J. 
Int’l L. & Pol’y 183, 188–89 (1994). 
113 David E. Sanger, Threats Shadow Talks on Nuclear Arms: Iran and North Korea, 
N.Y. Times, May 1, 2005, at A1. 
114 See Reinhilde Veugelers, Reputation as a Mechanism Alleviating Opportunistic 
Host Government Behavior Against MNEs, 41 J. Indus. Econ. 1, 1 (1993); see also 
David A. Lake, Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations, 50 
Int’l Org. 1, 14 (1996) (“[T]he more [relationally] specific the asset, the greater the 
state’s opportunity costs and thus the greater the costs inflicted by the partner’s op-
portunistic behavior.”). 
115 The 2004 model bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”), which the United States uses 
as the template for negotiating BITs with dozens of developing countries, provides 
that neither party can terminate the treaty during its ten-year initial term and that 
“[f]or ten years from the date of termination, all other Articles shall continue to apply 
to covered investments established or acquired prior to the date of termination.” 2004 
Model BIT art. 22, at 22–23, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/38710.pdf (last accessed Aug. 25, 2005).  
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When a state’s opportunism is temporal in nature, employing a 
strategy of exit rather than breach does little to mitigate the harm 
to a state’s reputation. In both instances, the state is consciously 
gaming the treaty to capture the benefits of the other parties’ per-
formance without undertaking the burdens of its own compliance. 
In the case of the NPT, for example, the United States has stressed 
that North Korea violated the treaty for several years prior to its 
denunciation,116 an accusation that heightens the opportunistic na-
ture of North Korea’s withdrawal and blurs the distinction between 
exit and breach. Moreover, a recent study labeled the NPT’s exit 
clause a “loophole” that aspiring nuclear powers could exploit to 
their advantage, and the report made closing that loophole a prior-
ity at the Spring 2005 NPT Review Conference.117 
Not all strategic uses of exit are the reputational equivalent of 
treaty breach, however, even where they possess elements of op-
portunism. Consider a threatened or actual withdrawal that trig-
gers a revision of the treaty to include terms more favorable to the 
withdrawing state.118 Is the use of such an exit strategy the reputa-
tional equivalent of a threatened or actual “breach in order to ex-
tract concessions from the other side”?119 The answer depends upon 
whether the other treaty parties perceive the strategy as an attempt 
to modify a previously bargained-for exchange, or, alternatively, as 
a response to changed circumstances.120 
116 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Top U.S. Official Calls on U.N. To Act To 
Curb Proliferation (Sept. 26, 2003), http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p 
=washfile-english&y=2003&m=September&x=20030926170536alretnuh0.8621027&t= 
xarchives/xarchitem.html. 
117 Oliver Thränert, The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Perspec-
tives in Advance of the 2005 Review Conference, SWP Research Paper (Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany), Aug. 2004, at 27 n.52, 28–29, http://www.swp-
berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=1062. According to one proposal, “states 
seeking to leave the NPT [would] have to justify this desire before a special confer-
ence of treaty members to be called immediately. This would considerably raise the 
bar for leaving the treaty. A withdrawal given in writing without any specific explana-
tion would no longer suffice.” Id. at 29. 
118 Barrett, supra note 29, at 160 (“The threat of withdrawal . . . can be a powerful 
means of influencing the behavior of other countries, provided of course that the 
threat is credible.”). 
119 Morrison, supra note 112, at 189; see also Lake, supra note 114, at 13 (labeling 
such a strategy as a form of opportunism). 
120 These two positions are polestars; intermediate exit strategies are also plausible. 
A prominent example is the manner in which the United States and the European 
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In the former case, if the withdrawing state has sufficient lever-
age, the remaining countries may ultimately acquiesce in a revision 
of the treaty’s benefits and burdens rather than lose the state as a 
treaty partner. (Imagine the concessions that countries with low-
lying coastal plains might make to a nation with a large manufac-
turing industry to preserve its membership in, and compliance with, 
a climate change convention.) But the reputational cost of such a 
maneuver will closely resemble a violation of the treaty if the exit-
ing state is merely seeking to capture gains or redistribute losses 
whose allocation the parties had previously negotiated. 
By contrast, exit in response to changed circumstances—
particularly unforeseen external circumstances or those that spe-
cially affect the denouncing party—may have very different reputa-
tional consequences. Although treaty makers try to anticipate such 
changes and provide rules or procedures for resolving them, they 
do not have perfect information. In some instances, states face un-
expected economic or political shocks that increase the costs of 
compliance. In others, regulatory environments shift in response to 
technological advances. In still others, international tribunals or in-
tergovernmental organizations may interpret a treaty in ways that 
its drafters had not envisioned. 
In each of these instances, exit can be a less costly response for 
the affected state than continued adherence to the treaty. More 
important from a reputational perspective, exit in these cases is 
easier to justify to the other parties than overt noncompliance.121 
This is particularly true if the withdrawing state uses the formal 
pre-exit notice period or informal statements to explain its decision 
to quit the treaty. 
Communities closed the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The governments 
adopted a “power play” in which they ratified the new WTO Agreement and then 
denounced the GATT 1947. In doing so, they effectively forced other GATT mem-
bers to do likewise if they were to enjoy the WTO’s benefits—benefits that were more 
favorable to the United States and the European Communities. Steinberg, supra note 
13, at 360. This example lies between the two scenarios I discuss in the text, in that the 
WTO Agreement both expanded the pie of the world trading system and gave a lar-
ger slice to industrialized countries. 
121 Changed circumstances also provide a plausible explanation for why there are 
more denunciations of older treaties than recent ones. See supra Section II.D Figure 
5. 
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Such explanations can be particularly important where the line 
between opportunistic withdrawal and withdrawal in response to 
changed circumstances is ambiguous. For example, in March 2005, 
the United States denounced the Optional Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, a treaty that confers jurisdic-
tion on the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) over interstate 
disputes relating to the Vienna Convention.122 Shortly after the 
withdrawal, a State Department official defended the United 
States’ decision in a manner calculated to minimize the potential 
harm to its reputation.123 He emphasized that the ICJ’s interpreta-
tion of the Vienna Convention was unexpected, that the United 
States would continue to adhere to the Vienna Convention itself, 
and, moreover, that it would comply with the judgments against it 
that the ICJ had already issued.124 The official also sought to bolster 
122 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Addendum to ASIL Insight, President Bush’s Determina-
tion Regarding Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rights, ASIL Insight 
(Mar. 9, 2005), at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insights050309a.html [hereinaf-
ter Kirgis, Addendum] (quoting Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, to 
Kofi Annan, United Nations Sec’y-General (Mar. 7, 2005)). The Bush Administration 
withdrew from the Optional Protocol after the International Court of Justice heard 
three cases involving foreign nationals on death row in the United States. In each 
case, the United States had violated the Vienna Convention by failing to provide con-
sular notification to the defendants or their respective governments. Although the 
United States conceded that it had violated the treaty, it disputed the remedy for such 
violation, specifically whether its courts were obligated to provide review and recon-
sideration of death sentences that had become final. See Frederic L. Kirgis, President 
Bush’s Determination Regarding Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention 
Rights, ASIL Insight (Mar. 9, 2005), at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03 
/insights050309.html. 
123 The political wisdom and political consequences of the withdrawal from the Op-
tional Protocol have divided commentators. Compare Fred Rosen, Opinion-US Is 
Worried About Mexican Security and Migration: It’s Not About Water, El Universal 
(Mexico), Mar. 21, 2005, 2005 WLNR 4346985 (criticizing the withdrawal from the 
Optional Protocol and suggesting that it will hamper the United States’ efforts to re-
solve other treaty disputes with Mexico), and Editorial, U.S. Pulls Out of Protocol, 
Miami Herald, Mar. 14, 2005, at A20 (“[The withdrawal] is both ironic and disap-
pointing. Ironic because the United States itself proposed the protocol in 1963 as a 
way of protecting U.S. residents abroad. Disappointing, because the United States 
should engage the world community, not hold itself apart from it.”) with, Editorial, 
Defensible Diplomacy, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 2005, at A22 (“The Optional Protocol 
was never meant to regulate the domestic judicial systems of its signatory states. The 
administration is right not to stand for the international court’s attempt to do so 
now.”). 
124 Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (Mar. 
10, 2005), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/43225.htm. The withdrawal also 
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the United States’ action by linking its withdrawal to the non-entry 
of other Vienna Convention parties, stating that “70 percent of the 
countries that are signatories to the Vienna Convention also de-
cided not to sign up to the optional protocol so it’s not just the 
United States going against everybody else. . . . [W]e are . . . joining 
an existing majority in not participating in the optional protocol.”125 
 
* * * 
The foregoing Sections have elaborated upon the similarities 
and differences between treaty exit and treaty breach, emphasizing 
their institutional, legal, political, and reputational dimensions. The 
analysis does not provide a precise formula for calculating the costs 
and benefits of exit in comparison to those of breach. It does, how-
ever, reveal that the consequences of the two actions are often dis-
tinct, highlighting the need to disambiguate exit from breach when 
modeling interstate behavior. 
C. Introducing Exit 
How then to introduce exit into models of international coopera-
tion and compliance? Although IR scholars have yet to address 
this question, a few experimental studies have considered how co-
operation is affected when the players face a trinary choice be-
tween cooperation, defection, and exit. One such study highlights 
the unreality of a Prisoners’ Dilemma that “offers no escape from 
the externalities that are the crux of the problem. The game as-
sumes a fixed population, and its unfortunate players have no al-
ternative but to stay and accept the payoff that is dictated by their 
personal cooperate-defect choice and the concurrent cooperate-
defect choices of others.”126 According to the authors of this study, 
raises difficult legal issues concerning the intersection of treaty-based and customary 
international law. In particular, because the Optional Protocol does not contain an 
express withdrawal clause, the validity of the United States action must be analyzed 
under customary international law and the ambiguously-worded Article 56 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to the extent that it reflects such custom. 
See Kirgis, Addendum, supra note 122; see also supra Section II.A (discussing Article 
56 of the Vienna Convention and the unsettled legality of exiting from treaties that do 
not contain an express exit clause). 
125 Ereli, supra note 124. 
126 John M. Orbell et al., Do Cooperators Exit More Readily than Defectors?, 78 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 147, 147–48 (1984); see also Rudolf Schuessler, Exit Threats and 
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a player’s ability to remove herself from the positive or negative 
externalities generated by other players is the defining characteris-
tic of exit: 
[T]he idea of externalities lets us define a person who exits as 
one who, in some way, moves beyond the reach of whatever ex-
ternal effects are generated by group members. This might be ac-
complished, of course, by various tactics short of geographic 
movement (one can sometimes withdraw from a group while re-
maining in the same location), but geographic movement is the 
classic form of exiting . . . . Thus, in the context of the prisoners’ 
dilemma, a person who exits is one whose payoff is not depend-
ent on the number of group members cooperating and defecting. 
The exiting person is freed from group dependency, either bene-
ficial or harmful.127 
To correct the omission of exit, the authors offered the players in a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma game the possibility of an attractive exit op-
tion (in the form of a fixed payoff available to both cooperators 
and defectors). Based on this payoff structure, they predicted that 
cooperators—who by definition receive lower payoffs than defec-
tors in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game—would find an exit option 
more attractive than defectors.128 Contrary to the authors’ expecta-
tions, defectors rather than cooperators left the game in greater 
numbers, a result that they attributed to an “ethical or group-
regarding impulse” that led cooperators not to act solely on the ba-
sis of “dollar rationality.”129 
Putting to one side the merits of why cooperators stay in the 
game rather than leave, this study suggests two central insights for 
the study of international affairs: first, that many real world coop-
eration problems can more accurately be modeled by adding a 
third exit option to the binary choice of cooperation or defection; 
and second, that it is important to link exit to externalities by in-
Cooperation Under Anonymity, 33 J. Conflict Resol. 728, 732 (1989) (challenging the 
absence of an exit option in an iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma and stating that 
“[a]bandoning a partner after a round of interaction is usually possible, although 
sometimes costly, in real life”). 
127 Orbell et al., supra note 126, at 149. 
128 Id. at 149–50. 
129 Id. at 147, 157. 
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quiring whether a state that quits a treaty must also abjure the bur-
dens and benefits of treaty-based cooperation by the remaining 
member states. 
In the Sections that follow, I explore each of these insights in 
turn. I first consider the effects of exit on coordination and collabo-
ration games. These two models of interstate behavior have payoff 
structures and equilibria that differ from the classic two-person 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, but they share with it the basic assumption 
that states must either cooperate or defect in each round of play.130 
I then assess the consequences of exit for “problem structure” 
theories of IR. This framework analyzes the types of conflicts that 
states seek to resolve, and the externalities they generate, to assess 
the likelihood of interstate cooperation.131 
1. Collaboration Games 
Collaboration games transfer the bilateral Prisoners’ Dilemma 
to multilateral settings in which nations act collectively to over-
come “dilemmas of common interests.”132 As Lisa Martin argues, 
states facing such dilemmas have a strong incentive to renege on 
prior commitments. “In a multilateral organization with a large 
number of members having diverse interests, the problem of temp-
tations to free ride will become especially acute. Although ongoing 
mutual cooperation provides long-term benefits, without the threat 
of specific retaliations, the temptation to cheat in order to maxi-
mize immediate payoffs rises substantially.”133 To alter these incen-
tives, treaty makers “should search for mechanisms to increase the 
shadow of the future” and “the sense of obligation among states” 
130 See generally Andreas Hasenclever et al., Theories of International Regimes 44–
59 (1997) (reviewing game theoretic models including collaboration games and coor-
dination games). 
131 See generally Hasenclever et al., supra note 130, at 59–68 (reviewing problem 
structure scholarship). 
132 Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic 
World, in International Regimes 115, 120 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (using a 
multi-player Prisoners’ Dilemma to explain “[t]he dilemma of common interests,” 
which occurs “when independent decision making leads to equilibrium outcomes that 
are Pareto-deficient—outcomes in which all actors prefer another given outcome to 
the equilibrium outcome”). 
133 Martin, supra note 80, at 97. 
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so that “the immediate costs associated with cooperation will be 
offset by long-run benefits of mutual assistance.”134 
One way to change states’ calculation of costs and benefits is to 
create robust international institutions or sanctioning mechanisms 
that deter states from enjoying the cooperation’s gains without in-
curring its corresponding burdens. But restricting exit opportuni-
ties provides another mechanism to extend time horizons and in-
crease multilateral cooperation, one that can supplement, or 
perhaps even supplant, strong monitoring and enforcement mecha-
nisms.135 
Treaties that seek to close the hole in the ozone layer or reduce 
the emission of greenhouse gasses provide helpful examples. Pro-
tecting the earth’s ozone layer and reducing global warming are 
classic collaboration problems. All countries would benefit from 
phasing out or reducing ozone-destroying chemicals and green-
house gasses. In the short term, however, each nation has an incen-
tive to free ride by continuing to use those substances while allow-
ing other states to switch to more costly, but environmentally-
friendly, alternatives.136 
Treaty makers can increase the long-term benefits of coopera-
tion and reduce the short-term incentives to cheat by encouraging 
“repeated, formalized interactions between nations.”137 One way to 
encourage such interactions is by increasing the duration of treaty 
commitments. As John Setear explains in his study of the ozone 
treaty regime, 
any limitation on the exit of individual parties is useful. Indeed, 
an outright bar against exit is presumably best, for the same rea-
sons that support an indefinite duration as the default length of 
134 Id. at 96, 97.  
135 The cooperation-enhancing function of exit restrictions in collaboration games 
also helps to explain why international law scholars have focused on multilateral 
agreements that implicitly bar denunciation or withdrawal. See supra Section II.A. 
136 See Todd Sandler, Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, 
and Economic Problems 30–32 (1997); John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and Interna-
tional Law, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 193, 200 (1999) [hereinafter Setear, Iteration]. 
137 Setear, Iteration, supra note 136, at 203. In the ozone regime, iteration takes the 
form of a principal convention and a series of later protocols and revisions. States use 
ratification of these tiered agreements as a signal of their adherence to particular lev-
els of commitment, thus promoting more durable cooperation and higher levels of 
compliance. Id. at 213–16. 
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time during which a treaty is effective after its entry into force, 
i.e. the parties are required to cooperate for the indefinite fu-
ture.138 
Setear makes the useful and underappreciated point that re-
stricting exit is one of the tools by which governments can encour-
age multilateral cooperation. But his claim that treaty makers 
should restrict exit to the maximum extent possible is insufficiently 
theorized. Constraining unilateral exit seems sensible when viewed 
from the perspective of a treaty that is already in force and has 
been ratified by all of the states affected by a collaboration game. 
But it fails to consider the costs of restricting exit ex ante, both 
when states are negotiating the agreement and when they are de-
ciding whether to ratify a treaty whose costs and benefits are un-
certain. At these earlier stages of an agreement’s life, permissive 
withdrawal clauses and few restrictions on denunciation are pref-
erable. The principal challenge treaty makers face is not, as Setear 
argues, closing exit, but rather setting optimal conditions on exit to 
encourage ratification while deterring opportunistic withdrawals 
after the treaty has entered into force.139 
2. Coordination Games 
Exit is also relevant in another strategic context—a type of coor-
dination game known as the “battle of the sexes.” This game is 
characterized by two equilibrium outcomes, one of which is pre-
ferred by each of the players.140 Yet the actors in a battle of the 
sexes game also share “a common interest in avoiding a particular 
outcome.” In other words, they do not agree on a preferred result, 
but “do agree that there is at least one outcome that all want to 
avoid”—non-cooperation.141 Coordination—aided by international 
agreements and institutions that facilitate interstate bargaining—is 
required if the players are to steer clear of the least preferred re-
sult. 
138 Id. at 223. 
139 See supra Section II.C. 
140 The name of the game is derived from the common example of a couple who 
would like to spend an evening together, but would prefer different activities, such as 
going to the movies and going to the opera. Hasenclever, supra note 130, at 47. 
141 Stein, supra note 132, at 125. 
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The process by which states have allocated radio frequencies, 
developed satellite communications policies, established air traffic 
control procedures, and harmonized technical standards for prod-
ucts and transportation are all examples of battle of the sexes co-
ordination games.142 Unlike a state that is a member of a treaty that 
regulates a collaboration problem, once an equilibrium for these 
coordination problems is reached, no state has an incentive to de-
viate from it unilaterally since doing so would only harm itself.143 In 
concrete terms, states prefer that all air traffic controllers speak 
English or all national railways use 36-inch gauges over the alterna-
tive of no coordination—a multiplicity of languages and railway 
gauges leading to transportation delays or disasters. 
The equilibrium achieved through coordination in a battle of the 
sexes game is the first-best outcome for some states. But it is only 
the second-best outcome for others, for example, a state that pre-
fers the native language of its aviation industry or the gauge width 
of its domestic railways. Countries in this second best position have 
no incentive to breach their treaty commitments unilaterally. They 
do, however, have a strong incentive to compel or induce their 
treaty partners to renegotiate the agreement to adopt their pre-
ferred outcome. As Lisa Martin explains, such pressure is applied 
not by surreptitiously violating previous commitments but rather 
by publicly signaling information about the state’s future plans. 
In coordination problems, no incentive exists for surreptitious 
cheating. Since the point of diverging from an established equi-
librium is to force joint movement to a new one, defection must 
be public. . . . [T]he point is to impose high costs on others in or-
der to force them to change their policies in a specified manner, 
which requires publicity about the reasons for and nature of de-
fection.144 
Although Martin labels such moves as “public defections,” her de-
scription of the underlying behavior closely tracks many of the dis-
142 For more detailed discussions of these examples, see Robert O. Keohane, When 
Does International Law Come Home?, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 699, 704 (1998); Stephen D. 
Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, 
43 World Pol. 336, 353–60 (1991). 
143 Martin, supra note 80, at 101; Stein, supra note 132, at 130. 
144 Martin, supra note 80, at 102. 
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tinctive characteristics of denunciation and withdrawal. In particu-
lar, exit provides an ideal strategy for changing to a new, more fa-
vorable equilibrium. As explained in Part I, exit is public, it re-
quires prior notice to other treaty members, and, because it does 
not involve a breach of the treaty, it carries a reduced risk of being 
sanctioned. 
An even more important characteristic is the delay between no-
tice of denunciation and withdrawal and the date exit takes effect. 
This notice period provides a window within which the denouncing 
state may threaten exit, forcing the other parties to move to a new 
equilibrium (by renegotiating the existing treaty or drafting a new 
agreement) without actually following through on its threat to 
withdraw. Such a strategy describes exactly the behavior that IR 
scholars have predicted: “An actor will [publicly] threaten to defect 
before actually doing so; it may choose to go through with its threat 
only if the other actor does not accede to its demands.”145 
Incorporating a formal exit option into analyses of treaties regu-
lating battle of the sexes coordination games also resolves an even 
more basic puzzle identified in Part I. It explains why a state would 
choose to publicize its intent to deviate from a treaty when weak 
enforcement mechanisms make surreptitious treaty breach difficult 
to detect. The payoff structure of coordination games is such that 
international agreements reflecting such games, once established, 
are self-enforcing and largely impervious to private cheating. But 
that same structure makes those agreements popular targets for 
public threats of denunciation and withdrawal as a means of shift-
ing to a new equilibrium. 
The foregoing analysis is incomplete, of course, without account-
ing for changes in power and technology. Powerful states are likely 
to be far more successful in using a denunciation strategy than 
weaker nations since their deviation from an existing equilibrium is 
likely to be more widely felt. But shifts in the geostrategic land-
scape may open up opportunities for weaker states to initiate a 
change in the rules, particularly if they act collectively.146 New tech-
nologies may also render an existing coordination point outdated, 
145 Stein, supra note 132, at 130 (emphasis omitted). 
146 For a discussion of such strategies as adopted by developing countries, see Laur-
ence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of Inter-
national Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 55–59 (2004). 
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suggesting a collective move to a new equilibrium. But path de-
pendencies or sunk costs may deter even moves that would be im-
provements for all states. In such situations, denunciation threats 
may serve as a necessary shock to move treaty parties to a more ef-
ficient outcome.147 
3. Problem Structure and Externalities 
Unlike game theory, problem structure theories of IR analyze 
subject-specific policy domains (such as trade, human rights, and 
arms control) and the conflicts within those domains to model in-
terstate cooperation.148 Although the precise contours of the prob-
lem structure approach are somewhat unsettled, its focus on the 
underlying objects of contention among nations generates useful 
real world insights. In particular, problem structure highlights the 
importance of externalities, both positive and negative, in identify-
ing the consequences of treaty exit. 
The central insight is that exit has radically different conse-
quences depending upon whether externalities are present and can 
be restricted to treaty members. The distinctions between treaties 
that govern private or club goods and those that regulate public 
goods aptly illustrate these concepts.149 
In the former category are free trade agreements that reduce tar-
iffs for products and services from other treaty parties. For these 
treaties, both the benefits and the burdens of lower trade barriers 
are restricted to member states. The ability to exclude non-
members means that a state which unilaterally withdraws from a 
trade agreement cannot surrender the burdens of membership 
without also relinquishing its benefits. The prospect of losing these 
147 Cf. Martin, supra note 80, at 114 (stating that in coordination games, “[c]hanges 
that give rise to a longer time horizon will likely lead to attempts to change the re-
gime” since the “short-term costs of forcing movement to a new equilibrium may be 
outweighed by the long-run benefits of the new outcome” (emphasis omitted)). 
148 See, e.g., Volker Rittberger & Michael Zürn, Towards Regulated Anarchy in 
East-West Relations: Causes and Consequences of East-West Regimes, in Interna-
tional Regimes in East-West Politics 9, 11–13 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1990). 
149 See Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, 
and Club Goods 347 (2d ed. 1996) (defining a “club good” as a good characterized by 
“the sharing of an excludable (nonrivalrous) public good”); Downs & Jones, supra 
note 27, at S112 (characterizing trade agreements as “treaties that regulate the ex-
change of private or club goods where exclusion is possible”). 
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benefits is sufficient to deter states from leaving, even where the 
treaty provides an unfettered right to withdraw. 
This analysis yields an important prescriptive insight for treaty 
makers: when negotiating agreements that regulate private or club 
goods, drafters can include capacious exit clauses to encourage 
broad ratification or enhance depth150 with less risk that states will 
later invoke those clauses to denounce the agreement.151 The point 
is even more consequential where private or club goods are pack-
aged with other cooperation problems into a single treaty or series 
of related agreements.152 For global package details of this nature—
of which the WTO Agreement is the most prominent example—
permissive exit clauses may allow states to play a two-level game,153 
appeasing domestic interest groups opposed to the treaty or uncer-
tain of its future benefits without diminishing the credibility of 
their commitments to other treaty partners.154 
Withdrawals from “public goods”155 treaties (such as military al-
liances or conventions to protect the global environment) have 
very different consequences. Neither the burdens nor the benefits 
of public goods treaties can be restricted to members.156 As a result, 
150 See supra Section II.C (identifying ex ante and ex post costs and benefits of treaty 
exit clauses). 
151 Anticipating that club goods treaties will have this binding tendency, govern-
ments may demand broad exit rules to facilitate later withdrawal. But even the most 
liberal exit rule (that is, an unfettered right to withdraw at any time for any reason) 
will not encourage opportunistic withdrawal if the benefits of membership are suffi-
ciently high. See Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: 
Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 681, 683 (1997) (noting that 
international “organizations offer significant benefits to their members, and few in-
ternational rules impose costs on a particular country so great as to justify resigning 
from a desirable club”). It is also plausible that the tendency of a club goods treaty to 
bind its members will emerge only over time after the consequences of membership 
become apparent. 
152 See David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 5, 6–18 (2002) (describing dif-
ferent types of issue area linkages in international agreements). 
153 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427, 433–35 (1988). 
154 Cf. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitu-
tional, and Political Constraints, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 247, 267 (2004) (“In the contempo-
rary WTO context, the threat of unilateral exit has limited credibility because it would 
be costly.”). 
155 Cornes & Sandler, supra note 149, at 8 (defining a public good as one character-
ized by nonrivalry of consumption and nonexcludability of benefits). 
156 See Orbell et al., supra note 126, at 148 n.1 (“[T]he absence of an escape oppor-
tunity is part of the standard definition of public goods.”). Nonexcludability cuts both 
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a state that denounces a public goods treaty (or that fails to ratify 
such an agreement in the first instance), can free ride on the coop-
eration of other nations without being exposed to treaty-based 
sanctions.157 The challenges thus facing treaty makers seeking to 
promote cooperation over international public goods are twofold: 
encourage all affected states to ratify and constrain those states 
that have already ratified from denouncing the treaty. 
Treaty makers use different strategies to meet this dual chal-
lenge. They may, for example, provide that a treaty will not enter 
into force until a critical mass of states has ratified the agreement, 
defined by number of countries, by their size, or by their financial 
or material contributions to the problem at hand. Alternatively, the 
drafters may specify that the treaty will terminate where denuncia-
tions have reduced ratifications below a specified threshold. Both 
rules ensure that states do not incur the costs of cooperation unless 
a sufficient number of other nations do as well.158 
Negotiators can structure exit clauses to augment these coopera-
tion-enhancing design features. For example, in cases of public 
goods treaties intended for ratification by only a small number of 
parties, an effective strategy may be to require all states to ratify 
the treaty before it enters into force and thereafter to bar unilateral 
exit altogether.159 For treaties regulating public goods that affect a 
large number of countries, however, such an approach creates an 
ways, however, since the “‘impossibility of exclusion’ [from public goods] implies 
the . . . ‘impossibility of rejection’ in the case of public bads,” in which actors absorb 
the full benefit of their actions but only a portion of the cost. Id. Examples of “public 
bads” are tragedies of the commons and transborder environmental harm. 
157 See Adam Chase, Barriers to International Agreements for the Adaptation and 
Mitigation of Global Climate Change: A Law and Economics Approach, 1 Envtl. L.J. 
17, 36 (1994). As noted above, however, extra-treaty sanctioning mechanisms may 
sometimes be available to deter free riding. See supra Section III.B.3. 
158 For an insightful analysis of treaty membership rules in international environ-
mental agreements, see Barrett, supra note 29, at 133–220. 
159 The Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Caspian Sea follows this design approach. The Convention, concluded in November 
2003, will enter into force only once it has been ratified by all five Caspian Sea littoral 
states. An initial draft of the treaty contained a denunciation clause, but the drafters 
later removed the clause to preclude the possibility of unilateral withdrawal by any of 
the five nations that had contributed to the Caspian Sea’s environmental degradation. 
E-mail from Danica Valnicek, Associate Expert, Policy & Law, UNEP Regional Of-
fice for Europe, to Author (Nov. 27, 2003, 03:50 EST) (on file with the Virginia Law 
Review Association). 
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increased risk that one or more non-ratifying states will prevent the 
treaty from entering into force. If negotiators reduce the agree-
ment’s ratification threshold or broaden its exit clause to avoid this 
problem, however, they must provide other incentives for all af-
fected states to join the treaty and to remain as treaty members. 
Restrictive exit clauses can also be effective for public goods 
treaties in which either the externalities that the treaty seeks to ad-
dress or the burdens and benefits that it generates are asymmetri-
cally distributed among the parties. A recent study of nonrecipro-
cal environmental harms and state power by Ronald Mitchell and 
Patricia Keilbach helps to illustrate this idea. According to this 
study, where a powerful nation produces a negative externality that 
injures a weaker state, the latter can induce the former to mitigate 
the externality only by making side payments that increase the he-
gemon’s utility from cooperation.160 Conversely, where a weak state 
is the externality producer and a powerful state is the unwilling 
consumer, the latter can use coercion to force a commitment to re-
duce the externality, although it too “may turn to rewards because 
making threats credible and potent can be difficult.”161 In both 
cases, the parties fear that the other side will not live up to its 
commitments: “Victims fear that perpetrators will ‘take the money 
and run’; perpetrators fear that victims will renege on compensa-
tion.”162 Closing or limiting exit may allay these concerns, “increas-
ing normative and social pressures on the other to carry out its part 
of the bargain”163 and producing a mutually beneficial and durable 
agreement once the initial hurdles to participation have been over-
come. 
The broader theoretical point, however, is that exit interacts 
with externalities and problem structures in ways that treaty mak-
ers can use to promote international cooperation. By tailoring de-
nunciation and withdrawal clauses to address these issues, negotia-
tors can improve the chances that a treaty will achieve its 
objectives. 
160 See Mitchell & Keilbach, supra note 98, at 903. 
161 Id.; see also id. at 902 (“When the victims of an asymmetric externality are 
stronger than the perpetrators, the former may simply threaten the latter to compel 
them to mitigate an externality at their own expense.”). 
162 Id. at 903. 
163 Id. 
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IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TREATY EXIT FOR INTERNATIONAL  
LAW AND POLITICS 
The previous Sections of this Article have identified the distin-
guishing characteristics of treaty exit, differentiated those charac-
teristics from breach of international obligations, and introduced 
the exit option to reexamine international law and IR scholarship 
on when and how nations cooperate. This Part sets the stage for fu-
ture research on exiting treaties by identifying four doctrinal and 
theoretical insights that result from the foregoing analysis. The first 
two Sections link exit to other risk management devices to help re-
solve unsettled issues of international law doctrine: (1) the rela-
tionship between treaty reservations and treaty denunciations, and 
(2) the status of the contested rule for terminating a treaty as a re-
sult of changed circumstances. The second two Sections analyze 
the consequences of exit for future empirical and theoretical re-
search in international relations: (1) specifying different payoffs of 
exit to model the relationship among the options of exit, defection, 
and cooperation in game theory, and (2) explaining group exit 
from standard setting treaties as a product of shifting equilibria in 
battle of the sexes coordination games. 
A. Linking Treaty Entry to Treaty Exit 
Unlike exit, numerous international law studies have been de-
voted to front-end treaty issues such as ratification and reserva-
tions.164 None of these studies, however, considers the link between 
treaty rules that condition acceptance of legal obligations ex ante 
and those that close or restrict withdrawal from those obligations 
ex post.165 Pairing these two perspectives helps to resolve an unset-
tled question of treaty law—the consequences for a state that has 
ratified a treaty with a reservation later determined to be invalid. 
To facilitate the widespread adoption of multilateral agreements, 
governments often refrain from compelling their partners to accept 
the entire package of treaty commitments. Rather, they permit 
164 See, e.g., Frank Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilat-
eral Treaties 2–4 (1988); Rosenne, Law of Treaties, supra note 30, at 356–57, 424–36; 
Edward T. Swaine, Reserving (Aug. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Virginia Law Review Association). 
165 For a recent exception, however, see Swaine, Unsigning, supra note 7, at 2071–77. 
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states to append reservations before expressing their consent to be 
bound to the agreement.166 Such reservations enable states to opt 
out of particular treaty provisions, insulating particular domestic 
laws or practices from international scrutiny. They thus transform a 
single negotiated text into a kaleidoscope of a la carte legal com-
mitments. 
For those treaties that do not preclude such unilateral opt outs, it 
is not always clear whether a particular reservation is compatible 
with the agreement’s “object and purpose.”167 If a tribunal or treaty 
review body later concludes that the reservation is invalid on this 
ground, the consequences for the ratifying country are uncertain. 
Three alternatives are possible. First, the state’s ratification may be 
nullified (and its treaty membership terminated) absent an indica-
tion of its intent to be bound to the treaty without the reserva-
tion.168 Second, the state may be considered a party to the treaty 
except for those provisions to which its invalid reservation applied. 
And third, the state may be deemed a party to the entire treaty, in-
cluding the article to which its now stricken reservation was at-
tached.169 
Commentators are sharply divided over the relative merits of 
these three approaches, particularly for human rights treaties 
which states have ratified with dozens of legally dubious reserva-
tions.170 Until recently, most observers favored either the first or 
second test. Scholars advocating the third approach have argued 
166 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333 (defining 
a reservation as “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, 
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it pur-
ports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State”). 
167 Id. art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336–37 (requiring all reservations to treaties that do 
not expressly authorize or preclude reservations to comply with an “object and pur-
pose” of the treaty test). 
168 This was the rule endorsed by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in Res-
ervations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 29 (May 28).  
169 For a comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of these three alternatives, see 
generally Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State 
Consent, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 531 (2002).  
170 See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, Introduction to Human Rights as General Norms and 
a State’s Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections to Human Rights Conven-
tions, at xv–xvii (J.P. Gardner ed., 1997); Liesbeth Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-
Human Rights Treaties: Ratify and Ruin? 3–12 (1995). 
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that, because states have an incentive to include more reservations 
than necessary to secure ratification, an invalid reservation should 
be presumed to be severable, leaving the state bound to the entire 
treaty.171 
Analyzing reservations together with denunciations yields an 
important insight that helps to resolve these doctrinal rifts. In the 
case of treaties that implicitly or expressly preclude exit,172 the costs 
of making an erroneous severability decision are high. If the reser-
vation was in fact a condition of the state’s consent to be bound, 
holding the state to the entire treaty without the benefit of the res-
ervation binds the state to obligations to which it expressly de-
clined to consent and from which it may not lawfully withdraw.173 
By contrast, where exit is available, error costs are lower and the 
presumption of severability far more defensible. If the reservation 
were in fact essential to the government’s decision to ratify, the 
state could correct the mistaken severance by invoking the denun-
ciation clause, as Trinidad and Tobago did in 2000 after the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee severed its death penalty reser-
vation to the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol.174 The more signifi-
cant and underappreciated theoretical point, however, is that se-
lecting an optimal rule for conditioning treaty entry cannot be 
made without considering the concomitant rules of treaty exit. 
171 Goodman, supra note 169, at 537 (identifying the incentives for a state to “in-
clude more reservations than required to obtain its consent” and stating that the “ad-
ministrative costs of monitoring and reviewing other states’ reservations make states 
‘sluggish in their reaction to reservations’”) (quoting Sinclair, supra note 2, at 63). 
172 At least four major human rights agreements do not contain denunciation or 
withdrawal clauses. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), Dec. 18, 
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Aiming at the Abo-
lition of the Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414. Under the prevailing 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention, state parties are precluded from withdraw-
ing from these treaties. See General Comment, supra note 32 (interpreting the lack of 
a denunciation clause in the ICCPR as precluding withdrawal by any ratifying state). 
173 Such an outcome harms not only the reserving state, but also the treaty system of 
which it is now a partially unwilling participant, since that system is likely to see 
higher rates of noncompliance by reserving states. 
174 See Helfer, Overlegalizing, supra note 5, at 1880–81. 
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B. Exit and Changed Circumstances 
Diplomats, government officials, and international law scholars 
have long debated the legality and wisdom of authorizing unilateral 
withdrawal from a treaty or nonperformance of its obligations as a 
result of a fundamental change of circumstances. Employing the 
Latin appellation rebus sic stantibus (loosely translated as “so long 
as conditions remain the same”), states seeking to unburden them-
selves from past treaty commitments have argued for such a doc-
trine on the ground that such changes radically transform the par-
ties’ obligations and undermine premises that were essential to 
their initial bargain. Arrayed against this position have been 
equally vociferous claims that recognition of a changed circum-
stances doctrine would be subject to rampant abuse and would un-
dermine the international legal system’s commitment to treaty 
compliance.175 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the doctrine has waxed and 
waned, operating “as both a vehicle for, and a brake on, change in 
the international order.”176 In recent years, however, rebus sic stan-
tibus has fallen into desuetude. It was codified in the Vienna Con-
vention in 1969, but in an extremely narrow and restrictive form.177 
More importantly, “there has never been a successful assertion of 
[the doctrine] in a court case and . . . no clear example of its suc-
cessful use in diplomatic exchanges.”178 
175 For detailed discussions of the doctrine, see Sinclair, supra note 2, at 192–96; 
György Haraszti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, in 146 Re-
cuil des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 1, 16–
37 (1977). 
176 David J. Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a 
Primitivist View of the Law of Nations, 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 38 (1988). 
177 Professor Bederman explains: 
The Vienna Convention provides that rebus sic stantibus cannot be invoked as 
a ground for termination unless the change in circumstances complained of (1) 
was an essential basis of consent by the parties . . . ; (2) was not foreseen at the 
time of negotiation; (3) radically transforms the obligations of the parties . . . ; 
(4) was not a result of breach by the complaining state; and (5) does not affect 
the establishment of a boundary. 
Id. at 28 n.156 (discussing the Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
at 347). 
178 Detlev F. Vagts, Book Review, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 614, 615 (2004); see also Setear, 
Iterative Perspective, supra note 80, at 171, 209–10 (characterizing the doctrine as 
controversial and discredited by most states). 
HELFERBOOK 10/26/2005 2:04 PM 
1644 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1579 
 
Commentators have largely ignored the doctrine’s decline or 
have attributed it to a renewed faith in the competing legal norm 
that treaty commitments must be obeyed. However, the option to 
exit from a treaty provides a more plausible explanation for why 
the rebus sic stantibus doctrine has all but evaporated from the dis-
course of compliance with international commitments. Because 
states may unilaterally denounce or withdraw from most treaties 
without justifying their conduct to other treaty parties, they need 
not rely upon the narrower and more controversial doctrine. Exit 
provides a far simpler—and legally incontestable—alternative for 
states seeking to remove themselves from treaties whose circum-
stances have altered. The fact that exit, although infrequent, never-
theless occurs far more often than successful invocations of rebus 
sic stantibus supports this conclusion,179 although more detailed 
study of how many and what type of treaties states denounce when 
circumstances change would be useful. 
C. Assigning a Payoff Value to Exit 
IR scholars have all but ignored exit when modeling interstate 
cooperation, an omission this Article seeks to remedy. As dis-
cussed above, however, a few experimental studies have offered an 
exit option to the players in a Prisoners’ Dilemma game.180 A key 
issue these studies have confronted is what payoff to award an exit-
ing player relative to the payoffs for the alternatives of cooperation 
or defection. In one such study, the payoff for exit was positive and 
took the form of a fixed payoff available equally to cooperators 
and defectors.181 Another study allowed any player to leave the 
game at no cost.182 
In international affairs, however, specifying a “payoff” for treaty 
exit is more complex. It requires a weighing of institutional, legal, 
179 See supra Section II.D (examining the frequency of exit from multilateral agree-
ments). 
180 See supra Section III.C. 
181 See Orbell et al., supra note 126, at 147 (offering an “attractive exit option” to 
players in an iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma game). 
182 See Schuessler, supra note 126, at 729 (offering a “no cost” exit option in an iter-
ated Prisoners’ Dilemma game). 
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political, and reputational costs and benefits.183 And it also involves 
assessing whether a treaty regulates private, club, or public goods, 
or a combination thereof.184 The identification of these distinct 
categories of exit costs and benefits provides the foundation upon 
which to build formal game theoretic models that tailor exit pay-
offs to these diverse real world settings to provide more accurate 
predictions of how nations behave.185 
A related theoretical point is that deciding what payoff to award 
players who exit cannot be set exogenously. Rather, such payoffs 
are an endogenous feature of the problem structural setting in 
which the players (that is, states) find themselves. This suggests an 
important pathway for future empirical research: exploring the de-
gree to which treaty negotiators consciously tailor exit rules ac-
cording to the identity of the parties or nature of the problem they 
seek to resolve. 
D. Group Exit, Coordination Games and New Equilibria 
A second promising avenue for future research concerns group 
exit from technical and standard setting treaties as a way to test IR 
hypotheses concerning state behavior in coordination game set-
tings.186 The database of treaty denunciations and withdrawals has 
revealed two broad types of group exits: (1) exit from multilateral 
standard-setting agreements (for example, treaties concerning 
roadway and maritime signals, ship measurements, and stops on 
183 See supra Section III.B (identifying the consequences of exit as including the loss 
of institutional membership and voice, intra- and extra-treaty sanctions, and reputa-
tional costs); see also Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International 
Agreements, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 501, 518–19 (2004) (identifying the costs associated with 
withdrawal from multilateral agreements). 
184 See supra Section III.C.3 (analyzing exit and externalities). 
185 For example, game theoretic models could set payoff structures to reflect the fact 
that states sometimes exit permanently from treaties and sometimes return to mem-
bership after several years. See supra Section II.A. 
186 See supra Section III.C.2 (discussing exit and coordination games). 
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bearer securities);187 and (2) exit from an earlier treaty as a condi-
tion of ratifying a later agreement concerning the same issue.188 
Treaties in the first category appear mundane and uninteresting. 
But this superficial banality obscures a rich theoretical body of evi-
dence. In particular, the subject matter of these agreements sug-
gests the underlying situation structure of a battle of the sexes co-
ordination game. And the subsequent denunciations by multiple 
countries suggest an attempt to move to a new equilibrium point 
within that game. 
Denunciations en masse may reflect an equilibrium shift that 
benefits all states, for example, as a result of technological im-
provements. Denunciations by a smaller number of treaty parties 
may indicate an attempt to shift from an old equilibrium that bene-
fits some states and disadvantages others to a new equilibrium with 
different distributional consequences. Both sorts of moves have 
been described in the IR literature on international cooperation, 
but few real world examples have been identified to assess these 
claims. 
Future research should also consider whether, and if so how, 
treaty makers influence these equilibrium shifts. For example, rules 
that specify a minimum number of ratifications for an agreement to 
remain in force may act as tipping points that force all states to 
move to a new coordination point after the designated threshold is 
reached.189 Treaties that require participating states to withdraw 
from an earlier agreement concerning the same subject matter can 
accelerate these trends and quickly lock in new equilibria. These 
187 See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Unification of Road Signals, Mar. 30, 1931, 
150 L.N.T.S. 247; Agreement Concerning Maritime Signals, Oct. 23, 1930, 125 
L.N.T.S. 95; Convention Regarding the Measurement of Vessels Employed in Inland 
Navigation, Nov. 27, 1925, 67 L.N.T.S. 63; Convention Relating to Stops on Bearer 
Securities in International Circulation, May 28, 1970, Europ. T.S. No. 72. 
188 See, e.g., European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage 
(Revised), art. 14(2), Jan. 16, 1992, Europ. T.S. No. 143 (requiring the denunciation of 
the European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, May 6, 
1969, Europ. T.S. No. 66, prior to or contemporaneously with ratification of the Con-
vention). Such a practice is common in the labor standards conventions adopted in 
the ILO. See Widdows, ILO Denunciations, supra note 55, at 1052 (noting the special 
rules applicable to denunciation followed by ratification of a revising Convention). 
189 See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Unification of Road Signals, supra note 
187, art. 15, 150 L.N.T.S. at 257 (specifying that the agreement will terminate if and 
when fewer than five states remain as parties). 
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examples suggest the need for detailed case studies of when and 
why states denounce treaties with these structural features.190 
CONCLUSION 
Treaty exit is a fact of life in the international legal system, al-
though it has often been shunned or ignored by international legal 
scholars and IR theorists alike. Deciding how much or how little to 
constrain exit is a concern of treaty negotiators, who use denuncia-
tion and withdrawal clauses to promote ratification and reduce un-
certainty about the future. And deciding whether and when to in-
voke these clauses is a concern of government officials when 
changed circumstances, shifting domestic preferences, or dissatis-
faction with treaty-based institutions create tensions between na-
tional interests and international commitments. This Article devel-
ops an interdisciplinary framework for analyzing the under-
explored phenomenon of treaty exit and provides a blueprint for 
future research. 
The analysis in this Article has been largely positive in nature, 
offering a theoretical, empirical, and doctrinal account of the de-
sign and use of treaty exit clauses. The normative implications of 
this analysis, however, cannot be ignored. Although the possibility 
of unilateral denunciation and withdrawal may seem anathema to 
the successful functioning of international law, this Article suggests 
a strikingly different conclusion—that exit may sometimes enhance 
interstate cooperation. 
A desire to promote cooperation may explain why treaty clauses 
authorizing exit are pervasive. As one among a suite of risk man-
agement tools available to treaty makers, exit clauses can provide 
the security states need to negotiate more extensive international 
commitments or encourage ratification by a larger number of na-
tions—outcomes that are often essential to resolving genuinely 
global transborder problems. 
Many denunciation and withdrawal clauses also impose condi-
tions on exit which help to promote cooperation among the parties. 
Such clauses prohibit denunciation in the early years of a treaty’s 
190 See Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and 
the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 361, 362–63 
(1999) (highlighting the importance of case studies to interdisciplinary scholarship). 
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life or after a state’s accession to membership, and they require no-
tice to the other parties. These restrictions help to stabilize treaties. 
They create an initial window of cooperation, force governments to 
think twice before going through the formal and public process of 
withdrawal, and provide a cooling off period during which the par-
ties may renegotiate the agreement or otherwise address the with-
drawing state’s concerns. 
Yet formal legal rules provide only a partial explanation for why 
governments continue to adhere to their treaty commitments even 
when a lawful and largely unfettered exit option is available. What 
keeps nations cooperating—and what drives them to leave treaties 
or to threaten to do so—are the institutional, political, and reputa-
tional costs and benefits of exit relative to alternatives, including 
compliance, noncompliance, and any of the other flexibility devices 
or safety valves that a treaty contains. Understanding these dynam-
ics, and their relationship to the forms and functions of law, will 
improve the accuracy of social scientific theories of how nations 
cooperate and will help international lawyers harness exit to better 
serve the ends of world order. 
 
